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  Abstract	  
This	  paper	  assesses	  the	  seven	  Chinese	  pilot	  carbon	  schemes	  that	  will	  be	  implemented	  in	  late	  
2013,	  and	  relates	  the	  most	  critical	  and	  relevant	  lessons	  from	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Emission	  
Trading	  Scheme	  (EU	  ETS)	  to	  the	  Chinese	  circumstances.	  This	  paper	  reviews	  the	  key	  policy	  designs	  
of	  the	  pilot	  schemes,	  and	  discusses	  the	  unique	  Chinese	  policies	  and	  market	  environment	  that	  
would	  differentiate	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  from	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  In	  terms	  of	  expected	  emission	  
abatement,	  this	  paper	  estimates	  that,	  compared	  to	  business	  as	  usual	  (BAU)	  level,	  Guangdong,	  
Hubei	  and	  Shanghai	  are	  expected	  to	  mitigate	  the	  highest	  amount	  of	  CO2	  emissions.	  In	  terms	  of	  
carbon	  price,	  this	  paper	  expects	  the	  schemes	  of	  Guangdong	  and	  Hubei	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  
carbon	  price	  while	  the	  price	  in	  Beijing	  and	  Tianjin	  will	  be	  the	  lowest.	  	  
	  
By	  reviewing	  EU’s	  experience,	  this	  paper	  proposes	  recommendations	  on	  1)	  avoiding	  allowances	  
over-­‐supply	  and	  windfall	  profits,	  2)	  maintaining	  market	  stability,	  3)	  bottom-­‐level	  allocation,	  4)	  
use	  of	  allowance	  reserve	  and	  provision,	  and	  5)	  sector	  selection	  and	  allocation.	  The	  paper	  finds	  
that	  the	  unique	  designs	  of	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  indicate	  a	  lower	  likelihood	  of	  price	  crash	  
than	  EU	  ETS.	  With	  regard	  to	  these	  special	  designs,	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes,	  the	  
paper	  concludes	  that	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  have	  a	  significant	  global	  implication	  in	  terms	  of	  
promoting	  a	  global-­‐wide	  ETS,	  reforming	  existing	  ETS	  and	  setting	  examples	  for	  developing	  
countries.	  	  
	   	  
	  Preface	  
This	  thesis	  originates	  from	  an	  internship	  I	  did	  at	  Point	  Carbon	  during	  August	  and	  October	  in	  2011.	  
The	  internship	  was	  to	  conduct	  a	  research	  on	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  carbon	  trading	  schemes	  after	  
China	  officially	  announced	  to	  establish	  domestic	  carbon	  trading	  schemes	  in	  June	  in	  the	  same	  
year.	  The	  internship	  was	  a	  very	  rich	  and	  interesting	  experience,	  from	  which	  I	  developed	  my	  
interest	  into	  emission	  trading	  and	  more	  generally	  the	  regimes	  in	  tackling	  global	  warming.	  During	  
the	  internship,	  I	  received	  tremendous	  help	  from	  my	  colleagues	  at	  Point	  Carbon,	  including	  Mr.	  
Tom	  Erichsen,	  Director	  of	  Advisory,	  Mr.	  Anders	  Skogen,	  Associate	  Director	  of	  Advisory	  and	  Yoav	  
Brandt,	  Senior	  Analyst.	  I	  was	  very	  enlightened	  from	  the	  interesting	  and	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  with	  
them.	  The	  valuable	  guidelines	  and	  recommendations	  from	  them	  were	  critical	  to	  my	  analysis	  on	  
this	  topic.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  use	  this	  opportunity	  to	  express	  my	  sincere	  gratitude	  to	  them.	  	  
	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  appreciation	  to	  my	  supervisor	  Frode	  Skjeret	  for	  his	  help	  during	  the	  
process	  of	  writing	  my	  thesis.	  He	  offered	  me	  important	  guidelines	  on	  how	  to	  conduct	  a	  scientific	  
research	  and	  be	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	  research	  topic.	  His	  detailed	  revision	  on	  my	  thesis	  played	  a	  
critical	  role	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  my	  thesis.	  Furthermore,	  his	  cutting-­‐edged	  insights	  in	  emission	  
trading	  were	  extremely	  helpful	  to	  improve	  my	  analysis	  during	  the	  phase	  of	  finalizing	  my	  thesis.	  	  
	  
I	  wrote	  this	  thesis	  while	  I	  was	  working	  full	  time	  at	  Statkraft	  Energi	  AS.	  The	  whole	  process	  has	  
been	  very	  challenging	  and	  time	  consuming,	  but	  I	  have	  enjoyed	  the	  whole	  process.	  The	  process	  of	  
writing	  this	  thesis	  developed	  my	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  towards	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  carbon	  
trading	  schemes	  to	  a	  new	  level	  compared	  to	  what	  I	  had	  during	  the	  internship.	  I	  will	  continue	  my	  
interest	  in	  this	  topic	  and	  hope	  my	  thesis	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  readers	  who	  are	  also	  interested	  in	  how	  
the	  world’s	  largest	  CO2	  emitter	  will	  operate	  its	  carbon	  trading	  market.	  	  
	  
Oslo,	  June	  15th	  2013	  
Li	  Zhang
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Part	  1:	  Background	  
Part	  1	  introduces	  the	  background	  of	  the	  paper.	  It	  firstly	  reviews	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  Chinese	  
emissions	  and	  the	  evolution	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  The	  key	  question	  to	  address	  is	  why	  the	  
Chinese	  CO2	  emissions	  grew	  at	  such	  a	  fast	  rate	  than	  anyone	  had	  anticipated.	  Furthermore,	  Part	  
1	  reviews	  China’s	  main	  measures	  to	  tackle	  the	  soring	  energy	  consumption	  and	  CO2	  emission.	  
The	  review	  outlines	  the	  policy	  framework,	  which	  includes	  the	  carbon-­‐trading	  schemes.	  At	  the	  
end	  of	  Part	  1	  is	  a	  brief	  introduction	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  emission	  trading.	  
	  
1. The	  rapid	  growing	  Chinese	  CO2	  emissions	  
The	  Chinese	  economy	  has	  been	  developing	  rapidly	  since	  1978,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  China	  decided	  to	  
open	  the	  country	  to	  the	  world	  and	  welcome	  foreign	  investment.	  Cheap	  labor,	  low-­‐cost	  land,	  rich	  
resources,	  and	  large	  amount	  of	  FDI	  boosted	  the	  country’s	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  China’s	  
GDP	  has	  grown	  to	  become	  almost	  20	  times	  bigger	  over	  the	  last	  30	  years1.	  However,	  rapid	  
economic	  growth	  imposes	  severe	  environmental	  challenge	  on	  the	  country.	  China’s	  economy	  is	  
heavily	  driven	  by	  resource-­‐intensive	  industries,	  such	  as	  steel,	  cement	  and	  other	  manufacturing	  
sectors.	  Low	  efficiency,	  un-­‐optimized	  production	  process,	  and	  under-­‐enforced	  environmental	  
regulations	  result	  in	  severe	  pollution.	  Chinese	  CO2	  emissions	  have	  grown	  tremendously	  over	  the	  
last	  decade,	  and	  this	  has	  caused	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  concern,	  both	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	  
On	  one	  hand,	  China	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  countries	  to	  global	  warming	  (National	  Reform	  
and	  Development	  Committee	  of	  China,	  2010).	  The	  potential	  consequences	  from	  global	  warming,	  
such	  as	  rise	  of	  sea	  level,	  will	  have	  a	  catastrophic	  impact	  on	  the	  coastal	  regions	  of	  China,	  which	  
are	  the	  major	  economic	  powerhouses	  in	  the	  country.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  has	  faced	  
increasing	  international	  diplomatic	  pressure	  on	  being	  required	  to	  cut	  CO2	  emission,	  although	  it	  
insists	  that	  developed	  countries	  should	  burden	  the	  prior	  responsibility	  in	  reducing	  CO2	  emission.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Based	  on	  2011	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	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Become	  world’s	  biggest	  CO2	  emitter	  in	  a	  short	  time	  
Just	  as	  if	  nobody	  would	  imagine	  China	  would	  become	  the	  world’s	  second	  biggest	  economy	  from	  
one	  the	  poorest	  countries	  in	  only	  three	  decades,	  no	  one	  has	  expected	  the	  country’s	  CO2	  
emissions	  grow	  as	  such	  a	  fast	  speed.	  In	  2000,	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IEA)	  and	  Energy	  
Information	  Agency	  (EIA)	  performed	  an	  emission	  forecast	  for	  China.	  However,	  both	  institutes	  
underestimated	  the	  growth	  heavily.	  In	  2000,	  the	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  from	  IEA	  and	  
International	  Energy	  Outlook	  from	  EIA	  predicted	  that	  China	  would	  overtake	  US	  as	  No.1	  global	  
energy-­‐related	  CO2	  emitter	  in	  around	  2020.	  However,	  in	  reality	  China	  surpassed	  US	  in	  energy-­‐
related	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  2006(Figure	  1.1).	  By	  2009,	  China’s	  share	  of	  global	  annual	  CO2	  emissions	  
had	  increased	  from	  5%	  in	  1980	  to	  24%,	  versus	  the	  share	  of	  EU	  as	  11%	  and	  US	  as	  17%.	  Chinese	  
CO2	  emissions	  were	  more	  than	  doubled	  by	  2009	  compared	  to	  2000	  level.	  The	  average	  annual	  
growth	  rate	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  was	  9%	  during	  2000-­‐2009.	  
	  
Mark	  D.	  Levine	  and	  Nathaniel	  T.	  Aden	  summarized	  four	  main	  reasons	  causing	  the	  Chinese	  CO2	  
emissions	  increase	  at	  a	  faster	  speed	  than	  the	  global	  energy	  research	  institutes	  forecast:	  1)	  
Economic	  reform	  allowing	  capital	  to	  flow	  more	  freely	  to	  high	  profit	  return	  investments	  which	  
stimulated	  economic	  growth	  and	  energy	  demand;	  2)	  Fast	  and	  massive	  expansion	  of	  urban	  
population	  resulting	  in	  increased	  residential	  electricity	  demand	  and	  cement	  usage;	  3)	  Energy	  mix	  
becoming	  more	  dependent	  on	  coal;	  4)	  Rapid	  growth	  of	  international	  trade	  after	  the	  entry	  of	  
WTO	  boosting	  the	  exports	  of	  energy-­‐intensive	  outputs.	  	  (Mark	  D.	  Levine,	  2008)	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Figure	  1.1	  Historical	  CO2	  emissions	  1980-­‐2009	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  Database	  2011	  
	  
1.1. Carbon	  mitigation	  targets	  and	  measures	  
Facing	  the	  severe	  environmental	  challenges,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  taken	  various	  policies	  
and	  measures	  in	  controlling	  environmental	  problems	  and	  energy	  consumption.	  In	  its	  latest	  Five	  
Year	  Plan	  (FYP),	  the	  12th	  FYP,	  China	  set	  the	  target	  to	  reduce	  energy	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  by	  16%	  and	  
CO2	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  by	  17%.	  The	  targets	  in	  the	  12th	  FYP	  are	  a	  continuation	  the	  previous	  FYP.	  The	  
aspects	  in	  terms	  of	  reaching	  the	  target	  compromise	  of:	  1)	  incorporating	  more	  clean	  energy	  
source	  into	  the	  primary	  energy	  supply	  mix;	  2)	  improving	  industrial	  energy	  efficiency	  with	  better	  
designed	  incentives;	  3)	  introducing	  market-­‐based	  mechanism	  to	  optimize	  overcall	  cost	  of	  energy	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Table	  1.1	  Energy	  and	  Carbon	  Related	  Targets	  








Energy intensity of GDP (% of 
reduction) 
 20% 19.1% 16% 
CO2 intensity of GDP (% of 
reduction) 
 No targets 17% 
Share of clean energy (% of 
primary energy) 
 10% 9.8% 11.4% 
GDP (annual growth rate)  7.5% 10.6% 7% 
Source: (HSBC, 2011) 
	  
A	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  specific	  measures	  
The	  content	  below	  presents	  an	  overview	  of	  China’s	  measures	  for	  mitigation	  energy	  consumption	  
and	  carbon	  emissions,	  in	  order	  for	  readers	  to	  understand	  where	  carbon-­‐trading	  scheme	  is	  
positioned	  in	  the	  overall	  policy	  framework,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  differed	  from	  other	  policy	  measures.	  
	  
Improving	  energy	  efficiency	  
The	  implementation	  of	  energy	  intensity	  target	  is	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach.	  The	  target	  allocated	  to	  
provincial	  and	  city	  level	  is	  legally	  binding	  to	  the	  local	  governors’	  evaluation	  of	  performance.	  The	  
potential	  for	  reducing	  energy	  intensity	  lies	  mainly	  in	  the	  industrial	  sectors,	  which	  accounts	  for	  
around	  70%	  of	  China’s	  energy	  consumption	  (Daniel	  H.	  Rosen,	  2007)	  (Figure	  1.2).	  The	  giant	  state	  
owned	  enterprises	  are	  also	  allocated	  with	  targets	  about	  reducing	  energy	  intensity	  and	  increasing	  
efficiency.	  An	  example	  is	  the	  Top-­‐1000	  Enterprise	  Program	  during	  the	  11th	  FYP.	  The	  program	  was	  
aim	  to	  achieve	  100	  mtce2	  of	  energy	  savings	  from	  the	  1000	  largest	  enterprises	  in	  energy	  
consumption,	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  top	  1000	  enterprises	  consumes	  33%	  of	  national	  
total	  energy	  consumption	  and	  47%	  of	  national	  total	  industrial	  energy	  consumption	  in	  2004.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Million	  ton	  coal	  equivalent	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12th	  FYP	  explicitly	  mentioned	  energy	  consumption	  auditing	  and	  carbon	  emission	  auditing,	  since	  
reliable	  reporting	  of	  energy	  consumption	  and	  CO2	  emissions	  is	  the	  foundation	  in	  evaluating	  the	  
implementation.	  Besides,	  reliable	  and	  independent	  audited	  energy	  consumption	  and	  CO2	  
emissions	  reports	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  strategic	  purpose	  of	  making	  energy	  consumption	  and	  CO2	  
emissions	  control	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  detailed.	  Compared	  to	  the	  11th	  FYP,	  in	  the	  12th	  FYP,	  
the	  building	  sector	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  new	  potential	  area	  to	  achieve	  higher	  energy	  efficiency.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.2	  Energy	  Demand	  by	  Sector	  2005	  
Source:	  (Daniel	  H.	  Rosen,	  2007)	  
	  
Cleaner	  energy	  mix	  
Another	  important	  aspect	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  clean	  energy3,	  and	  making	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  
plants	  more	  efficient	  and	  cleaner.	  To	  reach	  the	  11th	  FYP	  energy	  intensity	  reduction	  target,	  China	  
phased	  out	  60	  GW	  inefficient	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  capacities	  during	  2006	  and	  2009.	  The	  segment	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Primarily	  nuclear,	  natural	  gas	  and	  renewable	  energy	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large-­‐scale	  coal	  power	  plants	  increased	  significantly	  during	  these	  4	  years	  from	  13%	  to	  34%.	  
However,	  the	  shutting	  down	  of	  inefficient	  power	  plants	  took	  place	  in	  the	  form	  of	  politically	  
controlled	  approach,	  resulting	  in	  suboptimal	  cycle	  of	  power	  supply	  and	  demand.	  For	  instance,	  
approaching	  the	  end	  of	  the	  11th	  FYP,	  local	  plants	  were	  forced	  to	  shut	  down	  to	  meet	  the	  energy	  
intensity	  targets	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  blackout.	  (Tsinghua	  University	  ,	  2011)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.3	  Segment	  of	  Thermal	  Power	  Units	  2005	  and	  2009	  
Source:	  (Tsinghua	  University	  ,	  2011)	  
 
Market mechanism 
Having	  seen	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  using	  command	  and	  control	  approach,	  the	  Chinese	  
government	  has	  recognized	  the	  increasingly	  important	  role	  of	  market-­‐oriented	  mechanism	  in	  
mitigating	  energy	  consumption	  and	  carbon	  emissions.	  The	  term	  “market	  mechanism”	  refers	  to	  
the	  system	  where,	  instead	  of	  politically	  forced	  actions,	  price	  plays	  the	  fundamental	  role	  in	  
decision-­‐marking	  and	  incentivizing.	  The	  market	  mechanism	  compromises	  of	  the	  reform	  of	  
energy	  markets,	  carbon-­‐trading	  schemes,	  taxations,	  and	  increasing	  access	  to	  financing	  for	  
energy-­‐efficiency	  and	  environmental	  protection	  related	  projects.	  	  
	  
Compared	  to	  the	  11th	  FYP,	  the	  12th	  FYP	  emphasizes	  on	  market-­‐based	  approach	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  
implementation	  flow,	  reflecting	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  market	  by	  the	  Chinese	  central	  
government.	  However,	  many	  challenges	  lie	  along	  the	  transitional	  process	  from	  central-­‐planned	  
to	  market-­‐oriented,	  especially	  in	  the	  energy	  market.	  The	  deregulation	  took	  place	  in	  the	  90s	  and	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yet	  not	  fundamental	  change	  has	  been	  made.	  Relying	  on	  the	  market	  requires	  the	  construction	  of	  
infrastructure	  to	  realize	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market.	  The	  critical	  factors	  include	  market	  
transparency,	  regulation	  to	  ensure	  fairness,	  sufficient	  number	  of	  participants	  to	  guarantee	  
liquidity	  and	  competition.	  This	  however,	  might	  take	  several	  years	  to	  come.	  
	  
1.2. Analysis	  on	  the	  CO2	  intensity	  reduction	  target	  
In	  2009	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  Climate	  Summit	  the	  Chinese	  prime	  minister	  Wen	  Jiabao	  announced	  
China’s	  first	  binding	  target	  in	  mitigating	  domestic	  CO2	  emissions:	  to	  reduce	  CO2	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  
by	  40-­‐45%	  by	  2020	  below	  2005	  level.	  The	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  Chinese	  target	  
and	  the	  targets	  adopted	  by	  developed	  countries	  like	  EU	  or	  US	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese	  target	  is	  
intensity	  based.	  Therefore,	  this	  does	  not	  indicate	  any	  reduction	  in	  absolute	  terms,	  as	  China	  
insists	  that	  developed	  countries	  should	  primarily	  be	  responsible	  for	  absolute	  emission	  reductions.	  
	  
Since	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  Chinese	  targets,	  several	  researchers	  conducted	  research	  aiming	  
to	  evaluate	  if	  the	  Chinese	  target	  indicates	  any	  additional	  efforts	  need	  to	  be	  taken,	  compared	  to	  
BAU	  scenario.	  The	  common	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese	  intensity	  target	  requires	  additional	  efforts.	  
David	  I	  Stern	  and	  Frank	  Jotzo	  conclude	  that	  24%	  reduction	  in	  emissions	  intensity	  by	  2020,	  not	  40-­‐
45%,	  is	  reasonable	  business	  as	  usual	  scenario	  for	  China.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.4,	  the	  author	  
forecast	  three	  scenarios	  of	  the	  CO2	  intensity	  up	  to	  2020.	  Scenario	  1	  is	  the	  author’s	  preferred	  
scenario	  as	  the	  most	  likely.	  However,	  in	  such	  scenario	  the	  intensity	  only	  falls	  by	  24%.	  Scenario	  2	  
and	  scenario	  3	  indicate	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  targets	  and	  these	  two	  scenarios	  assume	  
ambitious	  policies	  are	  taken	  to	  accelerate	  technology	  change	  and	  improve	  energy	  efficiency.	  
(David	  I	  Stern,	  2010)	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Figure	  1.4	  China's	  Energy	  and	  Emission	  Intensity	  Forecast	  
Source:	  (David	  I	  Stern,	  2010)	  
	  	  
Below	  I	  will	  perform	  another	  type	  of	  scenario	  analysis	  from	  a	  mathematical	  perspective.	  As	  
explained	  below	  the	  change	  of	  carbon	  intensity	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  ratio	  of	  (1+annual	  CO2	  
growth	  rate)	  to	  (1+annual	  GDP	  growth	  rate).	  A	  low	  ratio	  implies	  CO2	  emissions	  grows	  at	  a	  slower	  
rate	  than	  GDP,	  and	  hence	  makes	  the	  target	  more	  possible	  to	  achieve.	  The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
low	  ratio	  can	  for	  instance	  be	  1)	  economic	  structural	  change	  that	  make	  the	  economy	  more	  driven	  
by	  low	  carbon	  sectors	  such	  as	  service	  sector,	  2)	  improved	  energy	  efficiency	  that	  one	  unit	  of	  
industrial	  output	  consumes	  less	  energy,	  3)	  increased	  usage	  of	  clean	  energy	  such	  as	  nuclear	  and	  
renewables.	  	  
	  
!"#$%&  !"#$"%&#'!"!" = !"2!""# ∗ 1 + !"2  !"#$%ℎ  !"#$  !. !. !"#$  2005−!20 !"!"#!""# ∗ 1 + !"#  !"#$%ℎ  !"!"  !. !. !"#$  2005−!20 !"	      = !"#$%&  !"#$"%&#'!""# ∗ 1 + !"2  !"#$%ℎ  !"#$  !. !. !"#$  2005−!20 !"1 + !"#  !"#$%ℎ  !"#$  !. !. !"#$  2005−!20 !"	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The	  result	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.5:	  By	  maintaining	  the	  historical	  ratio	  of	  97%4,	  the	  CO2	  intensity	  
will	  only	  fall	  by	  36%	  compared	  to	  2005	  level.	  If	  China	  manages	  to	  reduce	  the	  ratio	  to	  96%,	  it	  will	  
achieve	  the	  low-­‐end	  of	  its	  intensity	  reduction	  target	  by	  2018.	  Moreover,	  if	  the	  ratio	  turns	  out	  to	  
be	  high,	  say	  98%,	  CO2	  grows	  relatively	  fast	  against	  GDP	  compared	  to	  historical	  level,	  China	  will	  
only	  reduce	  its	  CO2	  intensity	  by	  26%	  by	  2020.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.5	  Scenario	  Analysis	  on	  Chinese	  CO2	  Intensity	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
Figure	  1.6	  presents	  a	  more	  intuitive	  relationship	  between	  CO2	  growth	  rate	  and	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  
under	  each	  above-­‐mentioned	  ratio.	  To	  reach	  the	  target,	  China	  must	  reduce	  the	  ratio	  from	  the	  
historical	  level,	  which	  means	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  CO2	  growth	  rate	  relative	  to	  GDP	  growth	  rate.	  On	  
average,	  CO2	  growth	  must	  slow	  down	  by	  0.6%-­‐1.1%	  relative	  to	  GDP	  growth	  compared	  to	  
historical	  level.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  sets	  its	  annual	  GDP	  growth	  target	  as	  7%	  over	  2011-­‐
2015.	  Therefore,	  the	  CO2	  growth	  rate	  needs	  to	  be	  controlled	  at	  5.9%-­‐6.4%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  ratio	  of	  (one	  plus	  cumulative	  average	  CO2	  growth	  rate	  between	  2005	  and	  2008	  (7.9%))	  to	  
(one	  plus	  cumulative	  average	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  (11.2%))	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Figure	  1.6	  CO2	  and	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate	  Under	  Each	  Ratio	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
2. Economics	  of	  emission	  trading	  
Emission	  trading	  market	  is	  an	  approach	  in	  environmental	  regulations,	  where	  economic	  
incentives	  are	  used	  for	  reducing	  emissions,	  contrasting	  command	  and	  control	  approaches.	  Under	  
command	  and	  control	  regulations,	  regulators	  collect	  information	  and	  command	  the	  polluters	  for	  
specific	  actions	  to	  tackle	  environmental	  pollutions.	  The	  main	  advantage	  of	  such	  regulation	  is	  the	  
simplicity	  in	  regulating	  a	  complex	  environmental	  process	  and	  therefore	  greater	  certainty	  in	  how	  
much	  pollution	  will	  be	  controlled	  to	  emit.	  However,	  the	  big	  disadvantage	  is	  the	  implementation	  
of	  such	  approach	  could	  be	  very	  costly:	  it	  requires	  the	  regulators	  to	  collect	  sufficient	  information	  
to	  make	  the	  choice	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  emitters	  in	  terms	  of	  pollution	  control.	  Because	  of	  this	  
disadvantage	  of	  information	  collection,	  the	  possibility	  of	  information	  distortion	  is	  high	  since	  
polluters	  have	  incentives	  to	  give	  false	  information	  to	  the	  regulators.	  (Kolstad,	  2000).	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  command	  and	  control,	  economic	  incentives	  give	  polluters	  proper	  incentives	  by	  
rewarding	  pollution	  control.	  Economic	  incentives	  generally	  comprises	  of	  fees,	  marketable	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permits	  and	  liability.	  Marketable	  permits	  allow	  polluters	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  permits	  for	  emissions.	  
The	  fundamental	  difference	  compared	  to	  command	  and	  control	  is	  it	  provides	  economic	  rewards	  
by	  allowing	  for	  trading	  between	  emitters.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  price	  of	  permit	  is	  generated.	  The	  emitters	  
hence	  face	  the	  economic	  decision:	  less	  emission	  means	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  excess	  permits.	  	  
	  
The	  graph	  below	  illustrates	  why	  marketable	  trading	  permits	  is	  more	  efficient	  than	  command	  and	  
control	  approach.	  Firm	  1	  and	  Firm	  2	  emit	  100	  units	  of	  pollution	  each.	  Total	  emission	  is	  hence	  200	  
and	  the	  regulator	  aims	  to	  reduce	  the	  total	  emission	  by	  70.	  Assume	  under	  a	  command	  and	  
control	  approach	  Firm	  1	  is	  allowed	  to	  emit	  50	  units	  and	  Firm	  2	  is	  allowed	  for	  80	  units.	  As	  a	  result,	  
Firm	  1	  will	  need	  to	  reduce	  50	  units	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  (40*1.5+10*2=80),	  and	  Firm	  2	  should	  decrease	  
20	  units	  of	  emission	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  (20*1=20).	  The	  total	  cost	  is	  hence	  100.	  In	  contrast,	  under	  a	  
marketable	  permit	  scheme,	  assume	  Firm	  1	  and	  Firm	  2	  are	  allocated	  with	  50	  units	  and	  80	  units,	  
respectively.	  The	  permit	  market	  will	  exploit	  the	  low	  cost	  abatement	  potential.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
total	  abatement	  of	  70	  unit	  of	  emission	  comes	  from	  30	  occurred	  in	  Firm	  1	  and	  40	  occurred	  in	  Firm	  
2.	  The	  permit	  price	  will	  eventually	  be	  set	  at	  the	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  of	  the	  whole	  market.	  In	  
this	  case	  is	  1.5.	  With	  such	  a	  price,	  Firm	  2	  will	  reduce	  the	  emission	  by	  40	  and	  sell	  the	  extra	  20	  
units	  of	  permits	  to	  Firm	  1,	  and	  Firm	  1	  can	  hence	  have	  70	  units	  of	  permits	  with	  which	  the	  firm	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  reduce	  the	  emission	  at	  a	  higher	  marginal	  cost	  of	  2.	  Both	  firms	  benefit	  from	  
trading	  the	  permits.	  Firm	  2	  make	  the	  profit	  from	  selling	  extra	  permits	  by	  (1.5-­‐1)*20=10,	  while	  
Firm	  1	  saves	  cost	  by	  purchasing	  20	  units	  permits	  as	  an	  alternative	  of	  cut	  its	  emission.	  The	  cost	  
Firm	  1	  saves	  is	  (10*2+10*1.5)-­‐(20*1.5)=5.	  Overall,	  the	  total	  abatement	  cost	  is	  40*1+30*1.5=85.	  
Compared	  to	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  100	  under	  command	  and	  control,	  marketable	  permits	  are	  more	  
cost	  effective	  since	  the	  low	  cost	  abatement	  has	  been	  utilized	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   12	  
	  
Figure	  2.1	  Illustration	  of	  Emission	  Trading	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  marketable	  permits	  approach	  has	  several	  disadvantages	  as	  well.	  The	  first	  is	  it	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distribution	  of	  the	  permits	  could	  be	  very	  political.	  If	  uncertainty	  in	  regulation	  arises,	  it	  might	  be	  
necessary	  to	  induce	  governmental	  intervention	  (Kolstad,	  2000).	  This,	  however,	  could	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  implement,	  as	  it	  requires	  a	  long	  process	  before	  the	  political	  decision	  is	  discussed	  and	  
made.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  an	  efficient	  market	  for	  trading	  permits	  requires	  the	  effective	  
governmental	  administration	  to	  ensure	  market	  transparency,	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  transaction	  
cost.	  The	  administration,	  again,	  could	  be	  very	  complex	  and	  challenging.	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Part	  2:	  The	  pilot	  schemes	  
The	  goal	  of	  Part	  2	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  thorough	  and	  in-­‐depth	  assessment	  of	  the	  seven	  pilots.	  Part	  2	  
includes	  four	  chapters.	  Part	  2	  first	  starts	  with	  Chapter	  3	  to	  introduce	  the	  basic	  information	  on	  
the	  pilot	  areas	  related	  to	  economy,	  geographical	  distribution,	  and	  demographics.	  Chapter	  3	  also	  
covers	  the	  carbon	  emission	  profile	  of	  the	  seven	  pilots.	  Chapter	  4	  reviews	  the	  policy	  design	  of	  the	  
pilot	  schemes.	  Chapter	  5	  then	  devotes	  to	  compare	  the	  abatement	  amount	  required	  in	  each	  pilot	  
area	  as	  well	  as	  the	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  across	  the	  pilot	  areas.	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  the	  
unique	  Chinese	  energy	  and	  financial	  market	  environment	  that	  have	  important	  implication	  on	  
implementing	  a	  carbon	  trading	  market.	  	  
	  
3. The	  seven	  emission	  trading	  pilots	  	  
In	  April	  2011	  the	  State	  Council	  of	  China	  announced	  that	  China	  would	  implement	  six	  pilot	  carbon	  
trading	  schemes.	  This	  decision	  follows	  the	  12th	  FYP	  that	  China	  will	  gradually	  implement	  market-­‐
based	  mechanisms	  to	  mitigate	  energy	  consumption	  and	  environmental	  pollution.	  Later	  on,	  the	  
municipal	  city	  of	  Shenzhen	  was	  also	  included	  to	  be	  the	  seventh	  pilot	  scheme.	  The	  seven	  pilot	  
schemes	  are	  hence:	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  Tianjin,	  Hubei,	  Guangdong,	  Shenzhen,	  and	  Chongqing.	  
(Figure	  3.1)	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Figure	  3.1	  The	  Map	  of	  the	  Seven	  Chinese	  Pilot	  Schemes	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon	  
	  
By	  estimate,	  the	  CO2	  emissions	  covered	  under	  the	  seven	  pilots	  amounts	  to	  800	  Mt.	  If	  so	  the	  
Chinese	  schemes	  will	  be	  the	  world’s	  second	  biggest	  ETS	  in	  terms	  of	  covered	  emissions	  after	  the	  
EU	  ETS.	  	  
	  
Table	  3.1	  Covered	  Emission:	  Chinese	  and	  EU	  ETS	  
	   Covered	  emissions,	  Mt	   %	  of	  regional	  gross	  emission	  
EU	  ETS	   2200	   40%	  
China	   800	   8.5%	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon	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Table	  3.2	  The	  Summary	  of	  Seven	  Pilots	  
	  




energy	  source	  in	  
2010	  (Mt	  CO2e)	  




60	   95	   110	   218	   40	   125	   67	  
Emissions	  
covered	  by	  the	  
ETS	  (%)	  








10,000	  tCO2	  	  
(2009-­‐2011)	  
20,000	  tCO2	  	  
(2009-­‐2011)	  
20,000	  tCO2	  for	  
industrial	  and	  
power	  sectors,	  




20,000	  tCO2	  or	  













Steel	  and	  Iron,	  
Chemicals,	  
Petrochemicals,	  














































Steel	  and	  Iron	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Table	  3.2	  The	  Summary	  of	  Seven	  Pilots,	  continued	  
	  
Beijing	   Tianjin	   Shanghai	   Guangdong	   Shenzhen	   Hubei	   Chongqing	  
	  
Offset	  quantitative	  limit	  
5	  %	   10	  %	   N/A	   5-­‐10	  %	   N/A	   10	  %	   N/A	  
Offset	  criteria	  
CCERs,	  half	  in	  
Beijing	  











Regional	  emission	  intensity	  reduction	  
targets	  (2011-­‐2015)	  
18	  %	   19	  %	   19	  %	   19.5	  %	   21	  %	   17	  %	   17	  %	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon	  
	  
3.1. About	  the	  pilots	  
Geographical	  distribution	  	  
As	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.1,	  the	  seven	  pilots	  include	  5	  municipal	  cities	  (Beijing,	  Tianjin,	  Shanghai,	  
Shenzhen	  and	  Chongqing)	  and	  2	  provinces	  (Hubei,	  Guangdong).	  The	  pilots	  represent	  the	  
geographical	  coverage	  of	  China:	  from	  North	  (Beijing)	  to	  South	  (Guangdong),	  and	  from	  East	  
(Shanghai)	  to	  West	  (Chongqing).	  Furthermore,	  the	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  the	  pilots	  
represents	  the	  coverage	  of	  different	  stages	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  development.	  The	  richest	  
parts	  of	  China	  lie	  along	  the	  eastern	  coast	  while	  the	  inland	  lag	  in	  economic	  development.	  The	  
under	  developed	  inland	  areas	  are	  represented	  by	  Hubei	  and	  Chongqing.	  With	  such	  a	  selection,	  
the	  experience	  from	  these	  pilots	  as	  a	  result	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  China.	  	  
	  
In	  theory,	  a	  large	  common	  emission	  trading	  market	  is	  more	  cost-­‐efficient	  since	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
achieving	  lower-­‐cost	  emission	  reduction	  increases,	  especially	  the	  inclusion	  of	  less	  developed	  
areas	  with	  emission-­‐intensive	  and	  less	  efficient	  industries.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.2	  Beijing	  and	  
Shanghai	  have	  a	  high	  share	  of	  service	  industry.	  The	  two	  most	  developed	  cities	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  
the	  highest	  cost	  for	  emission	  reduction.	  However,	  if	  the	  emission	  trading	  markets	  of	  the	  two	  
cities	  linked	  to	  the	  less	  developed	  areas,	  such	  as	  Chongqing,	  the	  marginal	  cost	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  
same	  level	  as	  Chongqing.	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The	  selection	  of	  the	  seven	  pilots	  also	  indicates	  that	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  
is	  to	  create	  a	  national-­‐wide	  carbon	  trading	  market.	  While	  it	  is	  too	  early	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  
national-­‐wide	  carbon	  trading	  market,	  the	  possibility	  remains.	  	  
	  
Economy	  and	  industry	  	  
As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.2,	  the	  size	  of	  Guangdong’s	  GDP	  and	  population	  is	  the	  highest	  among	  the	  
pilots:	  it	  is	  around	  three	  times	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  of	  the	  pilots.	  With	  the	  second	  largest	  GDP	  
and	  relatively	  small	  population,	  Shanghai	  has	  the	  highest	  per-­‐capita	  GDP	  among	  the	  pilot	  areas.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.2	  Pilot	  Area's	  GDP	  and	  Population	  20105	  
Source:	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  2011	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  industrial	  structure,	  the	  pilots	  have	  a	  large	  share	  of	  secondary	  industry,	  except	  for	  
Beijing	  and	  Shanghai:	  on	  average	  secondary	  industry,	  which	  is	  essentially	  heavy	  industries,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Due	  to	  lack	  of	  reliable	  data	  and	  information,	  Shenzhen	  is	  exempted	  from	  some	  of	  the	  
assessment	  from	  onwards.	  	  
	   19	  
account	  for	  a	  share	  of	  55%	  in	  total	  GDP.	  As	  the	  most	  developed	  regions,	  Beijing	  and	  Shanghai	  is	  
shifting	  towards	  an	  economy	  that	  is	  more	  driven	  by	  service	  industry.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.3	  GDP	  Composites	  of	  the	  Seven	  Pilots	  2010	  
Source:	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  2011	  
	  
3.2. Carbon	  emission	  profile	  
The	  gross	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  seven	  pilots	  amount	  to	  around	  1.6	  Gt,	  the	  gross	  emission	  
covered	  by	  ETS	  in	  total	  is	  some	  800	  Mt.	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Figure	  3.4	  Pilot	  Areas'	  CO2	  emissions	  and	  Growth	  Rate	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon,	  (Wang	  Zheng,	  2008)	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  carbon	  intensity,	  Hubei	  and	  Chongqing	  have	  the	  highest	  carbon	  intensity	  of	  above	  
200	  ton	  CO2	  per	  thousand	  Ren	  Min	  Bi	  (RMB)	  of	  GDP.	  The	  high	  intensity	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  
high	  share	  of	  heavy	  industry	  in	  these	  two	  pilots.	  Following	  Hubei	  and	  Chongqing	  is	  Tianjin,	  which	  
has	  a	  carbon	  intensity	  as	  175	  ton	  CO2	  per	  thousand	  RMB	  of	  GDP,	  as	  Tianjin	  has	  a	  large	  
production	  of	  steel.	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Figure	  3.5	  Carbon	  Intensity	  by	  Pilot	  Area	  2010	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon,	  China	  Statistical	  Yearbook	  2011	  
	  
4. The	  design	  of	  the	  schemes	  
4.1. Review	  of	  key	  policy	  design	  
So	  far,	  there	  have	  been	  any	  published	  official	  documents	  concerning	  the	  specific	  regulations	  and	  
policy	  of	  the	  schemes.	  However,	  officials	  have	  released	  key	  information	  and	  indication	  on	  the	  
policy	  design	  of	  the	  scheme.	  This	  session	  will	  review	  and	  summarize	  the	  key	  information.	  	  
	  
	  Allocation	  and	  trading	  at	  company-­‐level:	  News	  indicates	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  entities	  
covered	  under	  the	  schemes	  are	  companies,	  compared	  to	  installation	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS6.	  The	  
advantages	  is	  that	  company	  can	  use	  various	  measures	  to	  reduce	  emission,	  from	  upgrading	  
production	  technologies,	  improving	  energy	  efficiency	  of	  the	  office	  building,	  to	  replace	  old	  cars	  
with	  the	  new	  ones	  that	  are	  more	  fuel-­‐efficient.	  Various	  measures	  are	  applicable	  for	  the	  company	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  21st	  Century	  Net	  Mar	  2013,	  	  “Seven	  pilot	  schemes	  might	  start	  trading	  this	  June”	  
http://epaper.21cbh.com/html/2013-­‐03/26/content_62503.htm	  (in	  Chinese)	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as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  scheme.	  The	  disadvantage,	  however,	  is	  the	  complexity	  
in	  monitoring	  the	  emission	  reduction	  from	  various	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  company.	  Carbon	  
leakage	  is	  another	  risk.	  In	  general,	  there	  are	  three	  channels	  of	  leakage:	  1)	  from	  included	  sectors	  
to	  non-­‐included	  sectors	  within	  one	  scheme,	  2)	  from	  the	  schemes	  to	  regions	  outside	  the	  schemes	  
within	  China,	  and	  3)	  from	  schemes	  in	  China	  to	  abroad.	  The	  first	  and	  third	  channels	  are	  less	  likely.	  
For	  the	  first	  channel,	  the	  wide	  sectoral	  coverage	  of	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  eliminates	  such	  form	  of	  
leakage	  to	  a	  large	  extent.	  For	  the	  third	  channel,	  moving	  production	  abroad	  means	  the	  companies	  
lose	  the	  access	  to	  low	  manufacturing	  cost	  in	  China.	  This	  seems	  unlikely	  from	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  
perspective.	  However,	  the	  second	  channel	  of	  leakage,	  where	  companies	  move	  out	  production	  to	  
regions	  outside	  the	  schemes	  within	  China,	  are	  very	  possible	  to	  occur	  once	  the	  carbon	  cost	  
increase	  to	  a	  level	  at	  which	  it	  is	  more	  profitable	  for	  the	  companies	  to	  relocate	  production	  to	  save	  
carbon	  cost.	  	  	  
	  
CO2	  is	  the	  only	  greenhouse	  gas	  covered:	  In	  the	  pilot	  period	  China	  only	  cover	  CO2.	  The	  EU	  also	  
chooses	  CO2	  as	  the	  main	  GHG	  gas	  to	  cover	  under	  the	  scheme.	  Feasibility	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  
only	  covering	  CO2,	  as	  CO2	  is	  relatively	  easier	  to	  monitor	  and	  verify.	  A	  close	  approximation	  of	  
CO2	  emissions	  can	  be	  derived	  by	  multiplying	  energy	  consumption	  with	  the	  emission	  factor	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  specific	  technology.	  	  
	  
Spot	   trading	   only:	   China	   is	   still	   in	   a	   very	   early	   stage	   in	   developing	   a	   sophisticated	   and	   well-­‐
functioning	  financial	  forward	  markets,	  especially	  for	  commodities.	  An	  introduction	  of	  commodity	  
forward	  products	   requires	   lengthy	  assessment	  by	  policy	  makers,	  of	  which	   the	  China	  Securities	  
and	   Regulatory	   Commission	   (CSRC)	   is	   the	   key	   decision	   maker.	   China’s	   main	   concern	   is	  
speculation	   activities	   might	   negatively	   affect	   the	   economy.	   SCRC	   indicated	   that	   China	   should	  
start	   a	   carbon	   market	   with	   spot	   trading	   only,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   developing	   the	  
infrastructure	   of	   forward	   trading.	   The	   implementation	   of	   forward	   carbon	   trading,	   however,	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could	  be	   a	   long	  process.	   The	  planned	   launch	  of	   crude	  oil	   futures	  has	  been	   slow	  although	   this	  
product	  is	  fully	  supported	  by	  CSRC7.	  
	  
Annually-­‐set	  cap:	  Unlike	  EU,	  where	  cap	  for	  a	  period	  of	  years	  is	  pre-­‐determined,	  some	  Chinese	  
schemes	  indicate	  a	  different	  frequency	  in	  setting	  the	  cap.	  Hubei	  for	  instance,	  will	  set	  the	  cap	  
each	  year	  based	  on	  previous	  year’s	  emission.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  also	  indicates	  China	  might	  
not	  use	  an	  absolute	  cap	  that	  diminishes	  over	  the	  year.	  	  
	  
Offset	  is	  allowed:	  Hubei	  for	  instance	  allows	  companies	  to	  use	  offset	  credits8	  for	  compliance	  of	  
up	  to	  10%	  of	  the	  allocation.	  	  
	  
Banking	  and	  borrowing	  permits	  not	  allowed:	  Hubei,	  as	  an	  example,	  regulates	  that	  in	  the	  first	  
three	  years	  all	  companies	  need	  to	  sell	  surplus	  permits	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  compliance	  year.	  In	  
other	  words,	  permits	  allocated	  for	  a	  year	  is	  not	  valid	  for	  compliance	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  So	  far,	  
the	  indication	  is	  that	  the	  regulators	  would	  be	  the	  primary	  buyer	  of	  surplus	  permits	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
each	  trading	  year.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  companies	  can	  sell	  permits	  they	  were	  awarded	  for	  free,	  
might	  affect	  public	  budgets	  in	  an	  adverse	  manner.	  	  
	  
Set-­‐aside	  reserve	  permits:	  Indications	  suggests	  that	  the	  pilot	  schemes	  will	  reserve	  a	  certain	  
amount	  of	  permits	  not	  only	  to	  supply	  the	  demand	  from	  new	  entrants,	  but	  also	  to	  prevent	  the	  
price	  from	  being	  too	  high	  by	  dumping	  reserved	  credits	  to	  balance	  the	  supply	  and	  demand.	  	  
	  
Exchange	  involved	  in	  designing	  the	  scheme:	  Local	  exchanges	  are	  heavily	  involved	  in	  supporting	  
the	  regulatory	  bodies	  in	  establishing	  the	  scheme.	  Most	  of	  the	  exchange	  are	  by	  majority	  owned	  
by	   state-­‐owned	  entities,	  or	  backed	  by	   local	  governmental	  bodies	   related	   to	   state-­‐owned	  asset	  
management.	  In	  Shanghai,	  the	  exchange	  is	  even	  the	  main	  designer	  of	  the	  scheme.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Point	  Carbon	  Mar	  2013,	  “CORRECTION:	  Will	  2013	  mark	  the	  dawn	  of	  China	  ETS?”,	  
http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/marketsoverview/analysis/aus/1.2218885?date=201303
13&sdtc=1	  	  
8	  More	  detailed	  explanation	  and	  discussion	  on	  offset	  credits	  is	  in	  Chapter	  9.	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4.2. Covered	  companies	  and	  sectors	  
Covered	  companies	  and	  sectors	  
Table	  4.1	  compares	  the	  number	  of	  companies	  and	  sectors	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  covered	  under	  
each	  pilot	  scheme.	  
Table	  4.1	  Coverage	  of	  the	  pilot	  schemes	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Commonly	  most	  of	  the	  pilots	  cover	  the	  sectors	  that	  traditionally	  have	  been	  the	  major	  emitter,	  
such	  as	  power	  and	  heating,	  steel	  and	  iron,	  cement	  and	  chemicals.	  What	  appears	  interesting	  is	  
that	  the	  building	  sector,	  not	  covered	  by	  EU	  ETS,	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  Beijing,	  Tianjin	  and	  Shanghai.	  
Shenzhen	  as	  a	  single	  city	  includes	  a	  large	  number	  of	  companies	  under	  the	  scheme.	  By	  including	  
buildings	  as	  emitters,	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  indirectly	  covers	  sectors	  not	  regarded	  as	  heavy	  
emitters,	  such	  as	  the	  financial	  sectors,	  commercial	  properties,	  which	  in	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  
must	  comply	  the	  emissions	  from	  their	  buildings.	  
	  
Guangdong,	  as	  the	  biggest	  economy	  among	  the	  seven	  pilots,	  includes	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
industrial	  companies,	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cement	  companies.	  Guangdong	  will	  include	  some	  
120	  cement	  producers	  in	  the	  scheme.	  	  
	  
China	  allows	  freedom	  and	  flexibility	  for	  the	  pilots	  to	  choose	  the	  sectors	  and	  size	  of	  companies	  to	  
be	  included.	  Table	  4.1	  also	  shows	  that	  emission-­‐threshold	  for	  companies	  differ	  between	  pilots.	  
In	  Beijing	  and	  Shanghai,	  the	  threshold	  level	  of	  emissions	  is	  10	  000	  ton	  per	  year,	  only	  half	  of	  the	  
threshold	  in	  Guangdong.	  Hubei,	  in	  contrast,	  chooses	  energy-­‐use	  as	  threshold	  benchmark	  to	  filter	  
the	  companies	  to	  be	  covered.	  The	  firms	  are	  chosen	  based	  on	  a	  threshold	  level	  of	  for	  example	  
emissions.	  There	  is	  however	  no	  source	  explaining	  how	  the	  threshold	  is	  determined.	  In	  principle,	  
the	  historical	  emission	  and	  energy	  consumption	  data	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  threshold	  should	  be	  
verified,	  since	  firms	  have	  the	  incentives	  to	  report	  low	  historical	  emission	  levels.	  
	  	  
5. Abatement	  cost	  and	  carbon	  price	  
Before	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  national-­‐wide	  emission	  trading	  scheme,	  carbon	  prices	  will	  differ	  
between	  pilots	  because	  of	  the	  strictness	  of	  the	  pilot’s	  emission	  mitigation	  targets,	  historical	  
emissions	  as	  well	  as	  its	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  curve.	  This	  session	  compares	  the	  pilots’	  carbon	  
price	  by	  estimating	  the	  abatement	  cost.	  However,	  lack	  of	  research	  on	  estimating	  the	  carbon	  
abatement	  cost	  on	  the	  level	  of	  Chinese	  provinces,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  and	  reliable	  
data	  related	  to	  historical	  emissions	  makes	  this	  a	  challenging	  task.	  Estimation	  of	  sectoral	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emissions	  and	  so	  on	  must	  therefore	  rely	  on	  simplified	  assumptions	  and	  inputs	  with	  limited	  
quality9.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  several	  important	  reasons	  to	  estimate	  and	  compare	  the	  possible	  carbon	  prices	  
between	  the	  pilots.	  Firstly,	  the	  carbon	  price	  indicates	  the	  market	  value	  of	  the	  scheme.	  A	  high	  
carbon	  price	  incentivizes	  more	  attention	  on	  the	  market.	  Companies	  short	  in	  carbon	  must	  
consider	  how	  to	  hedge	  their	  carbon	  exposure	  and	  minimize	  compliance	  cost;	  while	  companies	  
that	  are	  long	  in	  carbon	  must	  optimize	  their	  strategies	  for	  selling	  their	  permits.	  Low	  carbon	  price,	  
due	  to	  either	  low	  mitigation	  costs	  or	  over-­‐supplied	  permits,	  indicates	  that	  the	  carbon	  cost	  is	  a	  
minor	  issue	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  market	  would	  not	  be	  active.	  Secondly,	  the	  
carbon	  price	  is	  the	  fundamental	  signal	  for	  making	  investment	  decisions.	  Pilots	  with	  relatively	  
high	  carbon	  prices	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attract	  investments	  of	  carbon	  mitigation	  technologies.	  
However,	  a	  high	  price	  also	  implies	  a	  larger	  degree	  of	  uncertainties	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  
emitters.	  High	  carbon	  cost	  would	  mean	  a	  large	  reduction	  in	  revenues	  in	  the	  companies	  with	  high	  
emissions.	  This	  impact,	  from	  a	  broader	  perspective,	  will	  influence	  local	  economic	  development	  
and	  employment.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  estimate	  is	  the	  expected	  mitigation	  of	  each	  pilot,	  which	  is	  the	  gap	  between	  business	  as	  
usual	  (BAU)	  emissions	  and	  targeted	  emissions.	  The	  targeted	  emissions	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that:	  the	  pilot’s	  GDP	  grow	  at	  historical	  rate10	  over	  2011	  to	  2015,	  how	  much	  would	  
the	  annual	  emission	  be	  to	  meet	  the	  pilot’s	  emission	  reduction	  target	  in	  the	  12th	  FYP.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.1	  and	  Figure	  5.2	  show	  the	  result11.	  In	  Figure	  5.1	  one	  can	  see	  that	  most	  pilots	  expect	  
steady	  emission	  growth	  over	  2011	  to	  2015	  except	  Guangdong	  and	  Hubei.	  Guangdong	  and	  Hubei	  
have	  relatively	  high	  annual	  emission	  growth	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  pilots.	  Guangdong	  
experienced	  an	  average	  growth	  of	  11%	  during	  2005	  and	  2007,	  while	  Hubei’s	  emissions	  grew	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  the	  details	  of	  the	  assumptions	  and	  inputs	  for	  the	  following	  assessment,	  please	  go	  to	  
Appendix	  I.	  	  
10	  Average	  annual	  emission	  growth	  rate	  during	  2005	  and	  2007	  	  
11	  Due	  to	  lack	  of	  data,	  Chongqing	  and	  Shenzhen	  are	  not	  assessed.	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10.4%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  primary	  driver	  for	  the	  emission	  growth	  was	  rapid	  growth	  in	  
heavy	  industrial	  sectors.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.2	  presents	  the	  expected	  mitigation	  amount	  if	  the	  pilots	  meet	  the	  emission	  intensity	  
reduction	  target	  while	  keeping	  GDP	  growth	  at	  historical	  levels12.	  Guangdong,	  the	  largest	  and	  
fastest	  growing	  emitter	  among	  the	  pilots,	  is	  required	  to	  reduce	  the	  emission	  by	  281	  Mt	  
compared	  to	  BAU	  level.	  Shanghai	  and	  Hubei	  need	  to	  reduce	  emission	  by	  40-­‐50	  Mt.	  The	  high	  
mitigation	  amount	  for	  Shanghai	  is	  due	  to	  the	  historical	  GDP	  growth	  and	  emission	  growth	  were	  
quite	  close	  to	  each	  other;	  therefore,	  to	  achieve	  lower	  emission	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  Shanghai	  needs	  
to	  maintain	  a	  low	  emission	  growth.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.1	  Pilots'	  BAU	  and	  Targeted	  Emission	  2011-­‐2015	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Average	  annual	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  during	  2006	  and	  2010.	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Figure	  5.2	  Mitigation	  amount	  by	  pilot	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
One	  interesting	  observation	  is	  that	  Beijing	  and	  Tianjin	  can	  emit	  more	  than	  their	  target.	  Especially	  
for	  Tianjin:	  the	  municipal	  city	  can	  emit	  more	  than	  60	  Mt	  compared	  to	  BAU	  emissions,	  because	  
over	  the	  past	  years	  the	  city	  has	  managed	  to	  reach	  an	  extremely	  high	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  of	  16%	  
while	  emission	  only	  growth	  at	  7.9%	  annually.	  Therefore,	  if	  Tianjin	  manages	  to	  keep	  the	  GDP	  and	  
CO2	  emissions	  growth	  rate	  at	  historical	  level,	  it	  would	  reach	  the	  intensity	  target	  naturally.	  The	  
challenge	  though,	  is	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  keeping	  such	  a	  high	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  versus	  a	  low	  
emission	  growth	  rate	  is	  rather	  unrealistic.	  
	  
The	  estimated	  mitigation	  levels	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  estimating	  the	  abatement	  costs.	  The	  
abatement	  cost	  is	  estimated	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  constructing	  the	  abatement	  cost	  curve	  
with	  regards	  to	  levels	  of	  abatement,	  and	  the	  cost	  is	  hence	  the	  abatement	  cost	  at	  which	  the	  
abatement	  will	  be	  achieved.	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  5.3.	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Figure	  5.3	  Abatement	  Cost	  Demonstration	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
The	  inputs	  of	  abatement	  cost	  curve	  relies	  on	  a	  research	  on	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  in	  China	  
from	  (Ellerman	  A.D,	  1998),	  (J,	  2000),	  (Tulpule	  V,	  1998)	  and	  summarized	  by	  (Gao	  Pengfei,	  2004).	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.4	  Marginal	  Abatement	  Cost	  Curve	  of	  China	  
Source:	  (Gao	  Pengfei,	  2004),	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
Abatement	  
cost	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By	  assuming	  the	  same	  curve	  shape	  of	  the	  pilot	  as	  China,	  and	  the	  abatement	  is	  a	  portion	  of	  China	  




Figure	  5.5	  Marginal	  Abatement	  Cost	  by	  Pilots	  
Source:	  (Gao	  Pengfei,	  2004),	  Author’s	  own	  construction	  
	  
The	  challenges	  for	  the	  model	  are	  the	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  and	  good-­‐quality	  data,	  and	  lack	  of	  
sufficient	  research	  on	  modeling	  the	  Chinese	  emission	  abatement.	  As	  such,	  the	  absolute	  number	  
of	  the	  cost	  might	  be	  biased	  since	  they	  are	  heavily	  relied	  on	  simplified	  assumptions.	  The	  
estimation	  brings	  indicative	  results	  that	  Guangdong,	  Hubei	  and	  Shanghai	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  
the	  highest	  carbon	  price.	  The	  primary	  reason	  is	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  expected	  abatement	  in	  
these	  three	  pilots.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  companies	  in	  Guangdong	  are	  likely	  to	  surrender	  under	  high	  carbon	  cost	  
compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  pilots.	  Given	  that	  the	  covered	  emission	  in	  Guangdong	  is	  much	  larger	  
than	  the	  other	  pilots,	  the	  value	  of	  carbon	  market	  will	  be	  significantly	  larger	  with	  the	  high	  price.	  
In	  the	  early	  phase,	  Guangdong	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  most	  interesting	  destination	  for	  market	  participants	  
in	  carbon	  investment.	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6. Carbon	  trading	  in	  the	  Chinese	  context	  
6.1. Highly	  regulated	  power	  market	  	  
The	  power	  sector	  is	  the	  sector	  with	  the	  largest	  potential	  to	  achieve	  emission	  mitigation,	  
especially	  the	  Chinese	  power	  sector,	  which	  is	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  emitter	  in	  term	  of	  sector	  
(Green	  Peace,	  2008).	  When	  considering	  emission	  trading	  in	  the	  power	  sector,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
notice	  that	  the	  European	  power	  sector	  is	  the	  most	  liberalized	  power	  market	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  
deregulation	  of	  power	  markets	  has	  been	  through	  a	  long	  process	  in	  Europe.	  Regions	  in	  Europe	  
such	  as	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  and	  Germany,	  have	  successfully	  implemented	  efficient	  power	  
trading	  platform,	  promoting	  competition	  in	  power	  wholesale	  market.	  This	  is	  represented	  by	  
large	  amount	  transaction	  volumes,	  large	  number	  of	  market	  participants	  including	  power	  
producers,	  retailers	  and	  traders,	  and	  the	  transparency	  in	  pricing	  and	  disclosing	  market	  
information.	  Successful	  power	  trading	  platforms	  are	  represented	  by	  power	  exchanges	  such	  as	  
Nordpool	  and	  EEX.	  With	  an	  effective	  market,	  the	  cost	  for	  power	  generation	  would	  be	  priced	  and	  
reflected	  by	  the	  prices.	  	  
	  
The	  Chinese	  power	  market,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  extremely	  regulated	  in	  many	  aspects.	  The	  top	  Chinese	  
official	  body	  in	  economic	  planning,	  the	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Committee	  (NDRC)	  
determines	  the	  wholesale	  price	  at	  which	  power	  producer	  can	  sell	  to	  the	  grid,	  and	  also	  the	  end-­‐
user	  price	  schedule	  at	  which	  the	  grid	  can	  sell	  to	  end-­‐users	  in	  various	  categories	  (such	  as	  
industrial,	  residential,	  special	  enterprises	  etc.).	  NDRC	  set	  the	  price	  schedule	  in	  coordination	  with	  
the	  price	  bureaus	  in	  local	  provinces,	  attempting	  to	  balance	  the	  interest	  between	  various	  interest	  
parties.	  This,	  however,	  has	  been	  proved	  a	  never-­‐easy	  task.	  Power	  producers	  argue	  for	  high	  
wholesale	  tariffs	  for	  sufficient	  margins	  to	  maintain	  generation	  and	  new	  investment.	  Grid	  
companies	  lobby	  that	  huge	  investment	  on	  constructing	  national	  and	  regional	  transmission	  
network	  need	  to	  be	  backed	  by	  enough	  margins	  from	  the	  spread	  between	  end-­‐user	  and	  
wholesale	  price.	  Local	  provincial	  officials,	  stress	  that	  low	  power	  prices	  is	  fundamental	  for	  local	  
industrial	  development	  and	  residential	  power	  consumption	  (Daniel	  H.	  Rosen,	  2007).	  Thus,	  the	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pricing	  in	  the	  power	  market	  is	  extremely	  complicated,	  involving	  factors	  as	  fuel	  price	  volatilities,	  
politics,	  and	  economic	  cycles.	  
	  
Figure	  6.1	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  many	  evidences	  that	  the	  current	  market	  structure	  and	  pricing	  
regime	  of	  the	  Chinese	  power	  market	  is	  very	  sub-­‐optimal.	  While	  the	  spot	  and	  forward	  contract	  
prices	  of	  coal	  negotiated	  at	  market	  rates,	  NDRC	  set	  a	  cost	  pass-­‐through	  regime	  for	  power	  
producers	  in	  which	  75%	  of	  coal	  price	  increase	  should	  be	  recovered	  by	  the	  corresponding	  amount	  
raise	  in	  electricity	  rates.	  However,	  in	  reality,	  such	  regime	  has	  not	  been	  realized	  as	  expected.	  
Figure	  6.1	  shows	  that	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  2004	  electricity	  price	  only	  rise	  around	  20%	  on	  
average	  of	  the	  coal	  price	  increase.	  The	  power	  producers	  hence	  operated	  at	  a	  loss13.	  (Daniel	  H.	  
Rosen,	  2007)	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6.1	  Historical	  Coal	  and	  Electricity	  Price	  Index	  
Source:	  (Daniel	  H.	  Rosen,	  2007)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  In	  the	  case	  of	  high	  coal	  price,	  a	  rational	  decision	  for	  the	  power	  producer	  would	  be	  to	  stop	  
operation.	  However,	  many	  power	  producers	  were	  required	  to	  produce.	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When	  carbon	  price	  is	  incorporated	  as	  part	  of	  the	  cost	  for	  power	  generation,	  a	  similar	  dynamic	  is	  
likely	  to	  occur	  between	  carbon	  cost	  and	  power	  wholesale	  prices,	  causing	  an	  unhealthy	  gap	  
between	  the	  coal	  price	  and	  controlled	  power	  price.	  In	  the	  first	  three-­‐year	  trial	  period,	  the	  carbon	  
price	  volatility	  has	  a	  limited	  influence	  on	  the	  profit	  of	  power	  producers,	  because	  the	  allowances	  
are	  allocated	  for	  free	  and	  according	  to	  official	  news	  the	  allowances	  will	  be	  allocated	  at	  sufficient	  
level	  to	  cover	  emissions.	  The	  allowances	  might	  actually	  be	  a	  source	  of	  profit	  for	  power	  
generators	  since	  they	  can	  sell	  unused	  allowances,	  which	  will	  be	  allocated	  for	  free,	  to	  producers	  
who	  want	  to	  produce	  more	  or	  to	  the	  regulator	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  year	  in	  the	  trial	  period.	  	  
	  
To	  maximize	  the	  utility	  of	  emission	  trading,	  the	  regulated	  power	  price	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  needs	  to	  
address,	  in	  progress	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  ETS.	  The	  deregulation	  of	  electricity	  market	  is	  
complex	  task	  in	  China.	  The	  short-­‐term	  practical	  solution	  would	  be	  a	  price	  regime	  that	  also	  
includes	  the	  pass-­‐through	  of	  carbon	  cost.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
6.2. Underdeveloped	  forward	  market	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  session	  4.1,	  in	  the	  trial	  phase	  China	  would	  only	  allow	  spot	  carbon	  permits	  trading.	  
The	   obvious	   reason	   is	   the	   underdeveloped	   forward	   markets	   in	   China.	   This	   is	   a	   fundamental	  
difference	   between	   China	   and	   EU.	   Since	   the	   launch	   of	   EU	   ETS	   in	   2005,	   several	   European	  
exchanges	   quickly	   introduced	   forward	   products	   related	   to	   carbon	   allowances	   trading.	   The	  
exchanges	   include	   the	   Intercontinental	   Exchange	   (ICE),	   European	   Climate	   Exchange	   (ECX),	  
Bluenext,	  Nordpool	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  products	  include	  futures	  and	  forwards	  written	  on	  Phase	  I	  and	  
Phase	  II	  EUAs,	  where	  the	  delivery	  date	  is	  normally	  in	  December	  or	  March.	  	  	  
	  
A	  forward	  market	  has	  several	  benefits.	  First,	  it	  allows	  regulated	  companies	  to	  hedge	  their	  carbon	  
exposure	  and	  hence	  reduce	  the	  risks	  in	  compliance.	  When	  holding	  a	  position	  in	  a	  forward	  market,	  
companies	  are	  able	  to	  lock	  in	  the	  carbon	  prices,	  and	  the	  gaining	  from	  the	  hedge	  offsets	  the	  high	  
carbon	  price.	  Second,	  the	  forward	  price	  has	  the	  effect	  as	  a	  price	  indication.	  Companies	  who	  are	  
interested	   in	   investing	   in	   carbon	  mitigation	   technologies	   reply	   on	   such	   a	   price	   signal	   to	  make	  
investment	  decision.	  In	  addition,	  the	  price	  influences	  the	  power	  producers	  to	  make	  operational	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decision.	   If	   power	   producers	   expect	   high	   forward	   carbon	   price,	   they	   would	   switch	   their	  
production	  to	  technologies	  that	  emit	   less	  carbon,	  such	  as	  switch	  from	  coal	  to	  gas.	  Last	  but	  not	  
least,	  forward	  carbon	  price	  is	  an	  important	  empirical	  source	  for	  research	  on	  carbon	  markets.	  	  
	  
If	  only	  allow	  spot	  trading,	  the	  signaling	  effect	  of	  carbon	  prices	  is	  limited,	  i.e.	  companies	  could	  not	  
make	  their	  decision	  based	  on	  forward	  carbon	  prices,	  and	  cannot	  hedge	  the	  future	  exposure	  via	  
forward	  markets.	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Part	  3:	  Lessons	  from	  EU	  	  
Part	  3	  focuses	  on	  the	  most	  relevant	  lessons	  for	  China	  from	  the	  EU	  in	  starting	  and	  implementing	  
the	  ETS.	  The	  lessons	  cover	  the	  aspects	  of	  infrastructure	  building	  for	  ETS	  and	  key	  policy	  design	  in	  
cap-­‐setting,	  allocation,	  sector	  coverage	  and	  some	  supplementary	  regulation	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
functionality	  of	  carbon	  market.	  Each	  chapter	  in	  Part	  3	  starts	  with	  introducing	  the	  policy	  design	  
and	  experience	  of	  EU	  ETS	  regards	  to	  the	  specific	  lesson,	  and	  goes	  further	  with	  relating	  the	  
lessons	  to	  China’s	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
7. The	  pre-­‐conditions:	  Emission	  data	  and	  projection	  	  
During	  the	  allocation	  stage,	  the	  EU	  member	  states	  encountered	  problems	  of	  lack	  of	  emission	  
data.	  With	  a	  long	  history	  of	  industrialization	  and	  technology	  development,	  most	  EU	  member	  
states	  have	  good	  quality	  emission	  data.	  The	  issue	  is,	  however,	  the	  difficulty	  in	  obtaining	  emission	  
data	  at	  the	  installation-­‐level.	  Even	  countries	  like	  Germany	  and	  Sweden	  had	  problems	  attaining	  
installation-­‐level	  emission	  data.	  Even	  though	  some	  member	  states	  were	  able	  to	  submit	  the	  data,	  
the	  big	  discrepancies	  between	  earlier	  submitted	  data	  and	  the	  final	  version	  indicated	  the	  limited	  
quality	  of	  the	  data.	  Denmark	  was	  the	  only	  member	  state	  that	  did	  not	  have	  such	  a	  problem	  since	  
a	  carbon	  emission-­‐trading	  scheme	  was	  already	  implemented.	  (Barbara	  Buchner,	  2006)	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  EU	  governments	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  data	  submitted	  from	  
installations.	  Although	  the	  covered	  companies	  had	  been	  very	  coordinated	  with	  the	  member	  
state	  governments	  in	  collecting	  emission	  data,	  the	  problem	  was	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  emitters	  to	  
over-­‐estimate	  their	  emission	  to	  be	  granted	  more	  allowances.	  This	  might	  also	  be	  one	  of	  the	  
reasons	  for	  the	  over-­‐allocation	  occurred	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  EU	  ETS.	  Another	  consequence	  due	  
to	  the	  limitation	  of	  data	  availability	  was	  to	  determine	  caps	  based	  on	  recent	  emission,	  rather	  than	  
earlier	  historical	  emission.	  For	  example,	  German	  preferred	  to	  cap	  and	  allocate	  based	  on	  1990	  
emissions,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  more	  consistent	  with	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  This	  proved	  to	  be	  non-­‐feasible	  
since	  it	  was	  almost	  impossible	  to	  retrieve	  installation-­‐level	  emission	  data	  from	  1990.	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A	  sub-­‐sequential	  problem	  following	  data	  limitation	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  emission	  projection.	  
Without	  sufficient	  historical	  coverage	  and	  quality	  of	  installation-­‐level	  data,	  the	  projection	  on	  
installation-­‐level	  emission.	  The	  main	  purpose	  for	  EU	  to	  perform	  projection	  is	  to	  have	  a	  reference	  
for	  determining	  national	  and	  sector	  total	  allocation.	  Projection	  became	  particularly	  difficult	  in	  
industrial	  sectors,	  where	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  heterogeneity	  exits	  due	  to	  the	  varieties	  of	  products,	  
inputs,	  factories,	  and	  technologies	  used	  in	  production	  lines.	  	  
	  
The	  problem	  of	  data	  availability	  and	  projection	  difficulty	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  China	  as	  well,	  
since	  available	  emission	  data	  is	  probably	  less	  than	  the	  EU.	  In	  terms	  of	  data	  availability,	  China	  has	  
good	  quality	  of	  energy	  consumption	  data	  of	  firms,	  enabling	  calculation	  of	  good	  approximations	  
of	  aggregated	  emission.	  Good	  quality	  data	  on	  energy	  consumption	  and	  industrial	  inputs	  is	  
available	  from	  the	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  These	  enterprises	  started	  the	  process	  of	  energy	  
consumption	  monitoring	  and	  environmental	  pollution	  monitoring	  at	  a	  very	  early	  stage,	  as	  they	  
were	  mandated	  to	  report	  energy	  usage	  to	  the	  central	  government	  or	  ministries	  to	  prove	  their	  
achievements	  in	  energy	  consumption	  control	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  improvement.	  However,	  
tone	  cannot	  expect	  similar	  availability	  of	  emission	  data	  on	  installation	  level.	  The	  mandate	  on	  
energy	  consumption	  control	  and	  efficiency	  improvement	  is	  normally	  allocated	  on	  firm	  level.	  	  
	  
Facing	  this	  problem,	  the	  first	  practical	  approach	  for	  the	  Chinese	  pilots	  is	  to	  follow	  EU’s	  
experience	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  most	  recent	  emission	  data.	  A	  second	  approach,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  
used	  already,	  is	  to	  allocate	  permits	  on	  a	  higher	  level	  instead	  of	  at	  the	  installation	  level.	  In	  the	  
trial	  phase,	  the	  pilots	  can	  allocate	  the	  permits	  based	  on	  the	  most	  recent	  emissions	  from	  each	  
firm	  affected	  by	  the	  scheme.	  The	  shortcoming	  of	  allocating	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  is	  that	  companies	  
might	  leak	  its	  emission	  to	  installations	  outside	  the	  scheme.	  Yet	  this	  approach	  simplifies	  the	  long	  
process	  of	  collecting	  data	  from	  installations,	  and	  avoids	  the	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  installation-­‐level	  
emission	  data	  with	  quality	  that	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  emission	  projection,	  although	  the	  projection	  itself	  is	  involves	  the	  complexity	  in	  
methodology	  selection,	  inputs	  gathering,	  model	  calibration,	  assumptions	  validation,	  the	  lessons	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from	  EU	  ETS	  suggest	  projection	  is	  nevertheless	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  functionality	  of	  ETS.	  The	  
lessons	  are	  also	  applicable	  to	  China.	  First,	  projection	  of	  pilots’	  total	  emission	  introduces	  the	  top-­‐
down	  discipline	  to	  control	  the	  tendency	  of	  over-­‐estimated	  aggregation	  of	  emissions	  in	  the	  
button-­‐up	  process	  (Barbara	  Buchner,	  2006).	  An	  independent	  projection	  provides	  another	  
reference	  to	  reconcile	  total	  emission	  with	  the	  sum	  of	  firm’s	  total.	  Second,	  projections	  give	  the	  
range	  of	  BAU	  emissions,	  and	  the	  reference	  to	  estimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  over-­‐allocation	  (Barbara	  
Buchner,	  2006).	  In	  these	  regards,	  projection	  is	  fundamental	  in	  designing	  emission-­‐trading	  
scheme.	  	  	  
	  	  	  
To	  mitigate	  the	  negative	  impact	  due	  to	  the	  big	  bias	  between	  projected	  and	  actual	  emission,	  the	  
first	  solution	  is	  to	  use	  a	  rather	  conservative	  estimate.	  However,	  given	  the	  great	  dynamics	  in	  the	  
Chinese	  economy,	  especially	  rapid	  process	  of	  urbanization	  and	  industrial	  transformation,	  a	  
projection	  over	  a	  long	  horizon	  is	  not	  practical.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  1:	  none	  of	  the	  
world’s	  best	  energy	  research	  institutes	  have	  succeeded	  in	  providing	  a	  close	  emission	  forecast	  for	  
China.	  A	  more	  practical	  alternative	  is	  to	  shorten	  the	  projection	  horizon	  to	  next	  or	  next	  2-­‐3	  years.	  
This	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  the	  allocation	  occur	  more	  frequent	  than	  EU	  ETS.	  Rather	  than	  
allocating	  for	  the	  whole	  trading	  period,	  the	  pilots	  can	  allocate	  permits	  over	  the	  next	  year,	  based	  
on	  the	  previous	  year’s	  emission	  and	  the	  most	  recent	  projection.	  By	  doing	  this,	  the	  impact	  of	  
biased	  projection	  against	  actual	  emission	  is	  controlled:	  it	  can	  only	  influence	  next	  year,	  after	  
which	  the	  bias	  would	  be	  corrected.	  As	  emission	  data	  improves	  and	  emission	  forecast	  knowledge	  
accumulates,	  the	  pilots	  can	  extend	  the	  projection	  period	  to	  a	  longer	  horizon,	  or	  include	  more	  
policy	  flexibilities	  to	  control	  the	  impact	  of	  projection	  bias.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8. Cap-­‐setting	  and	  avoiding	  over-­‐supply	  	  
Cap-­‐setting	  
How	  EU	  ETS	  determined	  the	  proper	  amount	  of	  emission	  allowances	  is	  a	  valuable	  lesson	  for	  the	  
pilots	  when	  designing	  their	  ETS.	  A	  properly	  set	  cap	  is	  fundamental	  in	  any	  cap	  and	  trading	  system.	  
On	  one	  hand,	  a	  cap	  should	  have	  a	  binding	  effect	  that	  ensures	  the	  emission	  reduction	  efforts.	  The	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cap	  should	  be	  lower	  than	  BAU	  emission.	  If	  the	  cap	  is	  too	  modest	  no	  extra	  means	  are	  needed	  to	  
mitigate	  the	  emission,	  neither	  will	  there	  be	  demand	  for	  purchasing	  allowances.	  At	  the	  end,	  
prices	  will	  crash	  and	  resulting	  in	  a	  very	  negative	  influence	  on	  emission	  mitigation	  related	  
investments.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  cap	  is	  set	  unrealistically	  tight	  that	  requires	  huge	  cost	  to	  
reach,	  the	  economic	  activities	  would	  be	  imposed	  with	  a	  heavy	  burden.	  	  
	  
During	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  EU	  ETS	  (2005-­‐2007),	  member	  states	  proposed	  the	  national	  emission	  cap	  
to	  the	  EU	  Commission,	  known	  as	  the	  national	  allocation	  plan	  (NAP).	  NAPs	  were	  generally	  based	  
on	  business	  as	  usual	  emission	  forecast.	  In	  principle,	  the	  proposed	  cap	  should	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
member	  state’s	  Kyoto	  targets.	  However,	  the	  caps	  were	  generally	  overestimated	  by	  member	  
states.	  This	  was	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  first	  phase	  as	  a	  trial	  period,	  where	  a	  lax	  cap	  
was	  more	  acceptable	  by	  regulated	  companies.	  Also,	  the	  EU	  commission	  was	  influenced	  by	  
lobbying	  and	  had	  inferior	  information	  (Steffen	  Brunner,	  2008).	  In	  Phase	  I,	  covered	  installation	  
received	  allowances	  for	  2080	  Mt	  CO2	  on	  average	  per	  year,	  while	  actual	  emissions	  were	  2020	  Mt	  
CO2	  annually.	  	  
	  
Over-­‐allocation	  	  
In	  Phase	  I,	  banking	  and	  borrowing	  is	  not	  allowanced.	  For	  example,	  companies	  cannot	  store	  2005	  
allowances	  for	  2006	  compliance.	  When	  verified	  2005	  emissions	  was	  published	  in	  April	  2006,	  
which	  was	  less	  than	  allocated	  allowances,	  the	  European	  Union	  Allowance	  (EUA)	  prices	  
experienced	  a	  sharp	  fall,	  as	  represented	  by	  EUA	  Dec-­‐07.	  Phase	  II	  also	  has	  a	  problem	  of	  over-­‐
allocation.	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Figure	  8.1	  Evolution	  of	  EUA	  Prices	  2005-­‐2007	  
Source:	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  P.	  L.,	  2008)	  
	  
The	  sharp	  decline	  of	  EUA	  Dec-­‐07	  contracts	  evidenced	  a	  controversy	  of	  EU	  ETS,	  known	  as	  over-­‐
allocation.	  Upon	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  phase,	  the	  EUA	  contracts	  for	  compliance,	  collapsed	  to	  close	  
to	  zero.	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  cap-­‐setting	  for	  the	  first	  phase	  was	  rather	  modest	  against	  the	  actual	  
emissions.	  Ellerman	  (2007)	  analyzed	  several	  reasons:	  first	  is	  the	  modest	  cap	  against	  BAU	  
emissions	  in	  the	  trial	  period.	  An	  emission	  cap	  becomes	  non-­‐binding	  if	  the	  BAU	  emissions	  turned	  
out	  to	  be	  over-­‐estimated.	  Weather,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  post-­‐adjusted	  emission	  estimation	  
methodology,	  could	  alter	  he	  actual	  emissions	  against	  the	  BAU	  estimate.	  In	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  EU	  
ETS,	  the	  deviation	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  on	  the	  low	  side.	  Second,	  determining	  the	  cap	  itself	  is	  a	  
difficult	  task.	  Insufficient	  historical	  emission	  data,	  uncertainties	  in	  projection	  make	  the	  cap-­‐
setting	  uncertain	  by	  nature.	  	  
	  
An	  efficient	  market	  should	  give	  clear	  and	  consistent	  price	  signal	  for	  investors.	  Extreme	  price	  
volatility	  deteriorates	  investors’	  confidence	  and	  hence	  the	  functionality	  in	  crediting	  emission	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reduction	  is	  weakened.	  In	  the	  scenarios	  of	  low	  prices,	  companies	  with	  surplus	  emission	  
allowances	  would	  suffer,	  especially	  companies	  whose	  allowance	  holdings	  occupies	  a	  large	  
portion	  of	  their	  portfolio.	  	  
	  	  
Lessons	  for	  China	  
What	  are	  the	  lessons	  for	  China,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  over-­‐allocation?	  The	  ultimate	  solution	  is	  a	  
sufficient	  tight	  cap	  that	  guarantees	  a	  binding	  effort	  to	  reduce	  emissions.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  
earlier	  this	  is	  difficult	  in	  practice	  given	  the	  complexity	  in	  cap-­‐setting	  and	  BAU	  emission	  projection,	  
since	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  represent	  all	  scenarios	  of	  economic	  growth,	  urbanization,	  
industrial	  transformation	  in	  a	  rapid	  developing	  economy	  like	  China.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  increase	  the	  frequency	  of	  setting	  the	  cap.	  EU	  ETS	  mandates	  the	  
cap	  for	  a	  period,	  known	  as	  “trading	  period”.	  The	  allowances	  allocated	  can	  be	  used	  for	  the	  
compliance	  of	  all	  the	  emissions	  during	  the	  trading	  period.	  Therefore,	  the	  supply	  of	  allowances	  is	  
static	  for	  that	  period	  once	  it	  is	  determined.	  The	  risk	  is	  then	  once	  the	  verified	  emissions	  in	  the	  
early	  years	  indicated	  a	  low	  level;	  the	  supply	  cannot	  be	  adjusted	  to	  the	  actual	  demand,	  which	  is	  
the	  actual	  below-­‐estimated	  emission.	  	  
	  
The	  Chinese	  pilots	  have	  chosen	  a	  different	  design.	  Hubei	  will	  set	  the	  cap	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  The	  
key	  reference	  for	  setting	  the	  annual	  cap	  is	  emissions	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  This	  introduces	  the	  
flexibility	  of	  adjusting	  the	  supply	  with	  recent	  demand.	  I	  expect	  the	  supply	  will	  be	  adjusted	  to	  the	  
demand	  in	  a	  positive	  correlated	  manner.	  I.e.	  increased	  supply	  next	  year	  if	  there	  is	  an	  indication	  
that	  actual	  emission	  most	  likely	  is	  higher	  than	  projected,	  or	  reduces	  allocation	  if	  lower.	  The	  
intention	  obviously	  is	  to	  avoid	  carbon	  prices	  being	  too	  high	  but	  also	  stabilize	  the	  prices	  from	  
going	  dramatically	  down.	  Compared	  to	  setting	  the	  cap	  for	  the	  whole	  trading	  period,	  Hubei’s	  
approach	  of	  annual	  cap	  setting	  has	  more	  capability	  in	  keeping	  the	  prices	  in	  the	  desired	  band.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  main	  limitation	  for	  this	  approach	  is	  it	  introduces	  political	  uncertainty.	  In	  EU	  ETS,	  
the	  price	  of	  allowances	  is	  subject	  to	  economic	  uncertainties	  once	  the	  periodical	  cap	  is	  mandated.	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The	  price	  of	  carbon	  is	  fundamentally	  related	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  economic	  activities	  that	  generate	  
emission.	  Whereas	  in	  Hubei’s	  ETS,	  the	  price	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  economic	  activities	  that	  
determine	  the	  emission,	  but	  also	  the	  annual	  political	  decision	  which	  determines	  to	  what	  degree	  
the	  cap	  next	  year	  would	  be	  adjusted	  to	  previous	  year’s	  emission.	  A	  strong	  signal	  of	  stable	  or	  
gradually	  increased	  carbon	  prices	  relies	  on	  strong	  and	  clear	  political	  commitment	  in	  
guaranteeing	  a	  binding	  cap.	  This	  political	  uncertainty	  is	  a	  source	  of	  risk	  for	  investors,	  given	  the	  
fast	  dynamic	  and	  complexity	  of	  Chinese	  political	  system.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  EU	  ETS,	  such	  political	  uncertainty	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  commitment	  to	  
ETS	  in	  a	  member	  state	  might	  alter	  when	  a	  new	  ruling	  party	  takes	  over.	  A	  ruling	  party,	  which	  set	  
industrial	  development	  at	  a	  higher	  priority,	  might	  reject	  any	  proposals	  to	  keep	  up	  the	  carbon	  
price.	  In	  China,	  although	  there	  is	  only	  one	  ruling	  party,	  the	  commitment	  on	  pre-­‐defined	  political	  
goals	  might	  differ	  when	  a	  new	  local	  governor	  takes	  over.	  The	  new	  governor	  might	  interpret	  the	  
policy	  from	  the	  central	  government	  in	  a	  different	  way	  than	  the	  precedent.	  To	  eliminate	  the	  
impact	  on	  ETS	  from	  the	  political	  uncertainty,	  the	  pilot	  schemes	  need	  to	  make	  clear	  political	  
statement,	  especially	  on	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  scheme	  aims	  to	  keep	  the	  carbon	  price	  stable.	  Such	  
statement	  could	  be	  1)	  the	  promise	  to	  guarantee	  a	  price	  floor	  for	  the	  carbon	  price,	  or	  2)	  a	  
limitation	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  local	  government	  and	  adjust	  the	  annual	  cap.	  A	  firm	  political	  
commitment	  protects	  the	  investment	  on	  carbon	  mitigation	  technologies	  and	  hence	  is	  a	  
fundamental	  element	  of	  the	  functionality	  of	  a	  carbon	  market.	  Since	  2012,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  
experienced	  record	  low	  EUA	  price.	  Several	  proposals	  have	  been	  raised	  to	  the	  European	  
Commission	  on	  how	  to	  rescue	  the	  EU	  ETS	  and	  boost	  the	  price	  to	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  level.	  
However	  all	  proposals	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  were	  all	  rejected,	  influenced	  by	  lobbying	  from	  
industrial	  groups.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  carbon	  price	  became	  very	  low,	  the	  coal	  production	  
increased	  to	  a	  high	  level	  and	  companies	  who	  made	  investment	  on	  clean	  energy	  source	  were	  hurt	  
deeply.	  For	  example,	  companies	  who	  invested	  in	  gas	  power	  plants	  experienced	  a	  huge	  loss	  as	  
the	  gas	  power	  plant	  is	  not	  profitable	  to	  operate	  with	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  carbon	  price.	  	  
	  
	   42	  
Hubei	  also	  introduces	  a	  unique	  regulation:	  companies	  must	  sell	  surplus	  permits	  each	  year,	  and	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  three-­‐year	  trial	  period,	  all	  unused	  permits	  are	  cancelled.	  One	  possible	  
intention	  for	  forced	  sales	  of	  surplus	  permits	  each	  year	  is	  to	  avoid	  speculation	  on	  permits	  prices	  
across	  time.	  When	  forcing	  sale	  of	  permits,	  companies	  with	  surplus	  permits	  can	  profit	  only	  at	  the	  
prices	  in	  the	  current	  year.	  They	  cannot	  bank	  permits	  to	  the	  following	  year	  with	  a	  speculative	  
intention	  to	  sell	  the	  permits	  at	  higher	  price	  next	  year,	  or	  reduce	  the	  cost	  by	  avoiding	  purchasing	  
permits	  in	  the	  following	  year	  if	  the	  price	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  expensive.	  This	  encourages	  
companies	  to	  either	  fully	  use	  the	  permits	  or	  sell	  at	  highest	  possible	  price	  with	  the	  year.	  This	  also	  
helps	  in	  stabilizing	  the	  price:	  banking	  permits	  to	  next	  year	  increases	  the	  supply,	  if	  not	  over-­‐
supply,	  to	  next	  year.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  approach	  is	  another	  form	  of	  governmental-­‐intervention	  into	  the	  market:	  set	  a	  price	  
floor	  for	  the	  permits.	  The	  advantage	  is	  it	  guarantees	  the	  minimum	  price	  of	  permit,	  reducing	  the	  
risk	  of	  investing	  in	  emission	  mitigation.	  Therefore,	  the	  downside	  of	  revenue	  is	  limited.	  The	  
revenue	  is	  still	  subject	  to	  risk	  in	  demand,	  i.e.	  not	  buyers	  of	  permits.	  The	  disadvantage	  of	  price	  
floors	  is,	  however,	  the	  elimination	  of	  competition.	  According	  to	  economic	  theory,	  a	  price	  control	  
distorts	  market	  efficiency,	  i.e.	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  market	  to	  reach	  the	  optimal	  equilibrium	  at	  
the	  market	  price.	  In	  reality,	  the	  practice	  of	  this	  theory	  is	  witnessed	  in	  the	  form	  that	  once	  the	  
price	  reaches	  the	  price	  floor,	  price	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  determinant	  of	  competition	  advantage	  anymore.	  
Instead,	  forms	  such	  as	  unfair	  access,	  bribery	  might	  become	  the	  competitive	  advantages	  in	  
permits	  trading.	  	  
	  
9. Avoiding	  windfall	  profits	  
The	  dynamics	  between	  carbon	  and	  power	  prices	  
In	  the	  Chinese	  regulated	  electricity	  market,	  without	  any	  regulatory	  adjustment,	  the	  cost	  of	  
carbon	  is	  not	  passed	  on	  to	  wholesale	  prices.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  value	  of	  allowances	  would	  not	  be	  
passed	  through	  to	  end-­‐users.	  The	  Chinese	  regulated	  market	  assumes	  a	  fixed	  margin	  over	  the	  fuel	  
costs	  and	  operation	  cost.	  The	  effect	  of	  allowances,	  if	  distributed	  for	  free,	  occurs	  as	  an	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opportunity	  cost	  to	  the	  generators.	  Generators	  will	  not	  choose	  to	  produce	  if	  the	  market	  value	  of	  
allowances	  rises	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  more	  profitable	  not	  to	  produce.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  liberalized	  electricity	  market,	  wholesale	  prices	  equal	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  the	  generator	  that	  
clears	  the	  market.	  The	  market	  value	  of	  the	  allowances	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  wholesale	  prices	  as	  
the	  prices	  contain	  the	  cost	  of	  allowances	  of	  the	  marginal	  supplier.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  practice	  it	  is	  
not	  likely	  that	  the	  carbon	  prices	  would	  be	  included	  completely	  in	  the	  wholesale	  power	  price,	  
since	  the	  price	  could	  also	  be	  set	  by	  fuel	  cost.	  
	  
Windfall	  profits	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  	  
During	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  EU	  ETS	  (2005-­‐2007),	  critics	  raised	  concerns	  about	  so-­‐called	  “wind-­‐
fall	  profits”.	  The	  controversy	  is	  such	  that	  power	  generators	  benefit	  from	  increased	  power	  prices	  
that	  incorporate	  the	  allowances	  that	  are	  freely	  allocated.	  However,	  windfall	  profits	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  
well-­‐defined	  concept.	  Where	  does	  the	  profit	  come	  from?	  Who	  are	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  profits?	  
Who	  bear	  the	  cost	  if	  the	  others	  gain	  the	  windfall	  profits?	  Is	  windfall	  profit	  fair?	  Or	  is	  it	  an	  issue	  
that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  designing	  ETS?	  	  
	  
First,	  where	  does	  the	  profit	  come	  from?	  In	  theory,	  when	  firms	  produce	  until	  marginal	  cost	  of	  
increasing	  production	  equals	  price,	  mc(q,e)=p,	  where	  mc	  is	  marginal	  cost,	  q	  is	  output,	  e	  is	  permit	  
costs.	  Assuming	  that	  mc	  at	  least	  increases	  with	  both	  output	  and	  permits,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
mc(q,e)	  –	  when	  q	  and	  e	  are	  positive,	  is	  larger	  than	  mc(q,0).	  The	  difference	  between	  mc(q,e)	  and	  
mc(q,0)	  is	  the	  profit	  as	  a	  result	  of	  zero	  permit	  price.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  windfall	  profits	  come	  
from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  wholesale	  power	  prices	  incorporate	  the	  permit	  price,	  while	  the	  allowances	  
are	  allocated	  for	  free.	  Power	  generators	  will	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  generation	  that	  needs	  extra	  
allowances	  purchased	  from	  the	  market,	  because	  the	  increased	  wholesale	  prices	  are	  offset	  by	  the	  
cost	  of	  allowances.	  The	  power	  companies	  that	  benefit	  the	  most	  are	  those	  with	  low	  marginal	  
abatement	  cost.	  They	  would	  benefit	  from	  generation	  sold	  at	  higher	  prices	  and	  selling	  the	  extra	  
non-­‐used	  allowances.	  The	  benefits	  come	  from	  the	  companies	  that	  need	  to	  purchase	  allowances.	  
For	  instance,	  a	  coal	  power	  producer	  with	  low	  cost	  flexibility	  to	  switch	  to	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  would	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replace	  its	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  generation	  with	  less	  CO2	  intensive	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  generation.	  It	  
would	  hence	  benefit	  from	  higher	  wholesale	  prices	  and	  the	  sales	  of	  extra	  allowances	  because	  of	  
using	  gas-­‐fired	  power,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  gas	  prices	  is	  low	  enough	  and	  carbon	  prices	  is	  high	  enough	  to	  
ensure	  margin	  over	  the	  abatement	  cost.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  example	  of	  switching	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  to	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  follows	  the	  principle	  of	  ETS:	  
incentivizing	  the	  use	  of	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies.	  However,	  the	  unfair	  aspect	  of	  windfall	  profits	  is	  
that	  power	  generators	  that	  do	  not	  implement	  abatement	  measures	  also	  benefit	  from	  higher	  
wholesale	  prices.	  Assuming	  that	  higher	  wholesale	  prices	  can	  be	  quickly	  pass	  over	  to	  retailer	  
prices,	  increases	  in	  wholesale	  prices	  would	  indicate	  higher	  cost	  for	  power	  users,	  especially	  the	  
companies	  in	  the	  power-­‐intensive	  sectors	  such	  as	  cement	  and	  steel.	  As	  a	  result,	  higher	  wholesale	  
power	  prices	  mean	  that	  a	  pie	  of	  profit	  is	  transferred	  from	  those	  sectors	  to	  the	  power	  sectors,	  
which	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  emission	  trading.	  
	  
Lessons	  for	  China	  
To	  tackle	  generating	  windfall	  profits	  from	  ETS,	  the	  EU	  commission	  will	  gradually	  increase	  the	  
amount	  of	  allowances	  to	  be	  auctioned	  rather	  than	  grandfathered.	  In	  Phase	  III,	  the	  power	  sector	  
will	  need	  to	  purchase	  all	  the	  allowances	  via	  auctioning.	  The	  percentage	  of	  auctioned	  allowances	  
in	  other	  sectors	  will	  gradually	  increase	  from	  20%	  in	  2013	  to	  100%	  by	  2020.	  Overall,	  some	  60%	  of	  
total	  allowances	  will	  be	  auctioned	  in	  2013.	  Through	  auctioning	  the	  Commission	  expect	  to	  offset	  
the	  profits	  from	  higher	  power	  prices	  by	  auction	  cost.	  	  
	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  Chinese	  power	  sector	  being	  highly	  regulated	  indicates	  different	  pattern	  of	  
windfall	  profits	  to	  power	  generators	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  ETS,	  if	  any.	  The	  power	  price	  in	  
China	  is	  normally	  adjusted	  on	  a	  non-­‐regular	  basis	  by	  NDRC.	  The	  primary	  consideration	  of	  the	  
adjustment	  is	  fuel	  price.	  With	  carbon	  as	  a	  new	  source	  of	  cost	  for	  power	  generation,	  there	  is	  
possibility	  that	  NDRC	  would	  adjust	  the	  power	  price	  to	  ensure	  the	  profitability	  of	  the	  power	  
generators	  over	  the	  increased	  cost.	  The	  challenge	  though	  is	  that	  the	  regulatory	  adjustment	  is	  not	  
optimal	  compared	  to	  if	  could	  prices	  were	  adjusted	  by	  the	  market	  itself.	  The	  ad-­‐hoc	  price	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adjustment	  is	  often	  in	  delay	  after	  the	  fuel	  price	  increase.	  If	  the	  price	  is	  also	  adjusted	  upwards	  by	  
incorporating	  carbon	  cost,	  windfall	  profits	  problem	  will	  occur	  in	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  as	  well,	  as	  
long	  as	  the	  allowances	  is	  grandfathered.	  As	  experienced	  by	  EU,	  the	  consequence	  of	  windfall	  
profits	  is	  the	  rise	  of	  controversies	  against	  emission	  trading,	  and	  an	  unfair	  profit	  distribution	  
where	  power	  generators	  benefit	  from	  selling	  at	  higher	  power	  price	  to	  other	  sectors	  without	  cost	  
increases.	  The	  schemes	  indicate	  the	  possibility	  to	  use	  auction	  in	  the	  future.	  Like	  the	  EU,	  
allocating	  emission	  permits	  for	  free	  has	  the	  benefits	  of	  gaining	  industrial	  acceptance.	  With	  this	  
regards,	  in	  the	  early	  trial	  periods	  free	  allocation	  is	  not	  necessary	  a	  bad	  thing,	  if	  it	  facilitates	  
launching	  the	  emission	  trading	  schemes	  smoothly.	  	  
	  
10. Sector	  coverage	  and	  sectoral	  allocation	  	  
Academic	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  a	  wider	  coverage	  of	  emission	  trading	  scheme	  is	  more	  efficient,	  
in	  terms	  of	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  emission	  reduction	  and	  market	  operation.	  Böhringer	  and	  
Löschel	  (2005)	  find	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  when	  the	  ETS	  coverage	  is	  economy-­‐
wide	  compared	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  sectors	  (Böhringer,	  2005).	  Baron	  and	  Bygrave	  on	  the	  
other	  hand	  argue	  that	  broad	  coverage	  increase	  the	  liquidity	  and	  efficiency	  of	  carbon	  markets.	  
(Baron,	  2002).	  These	  findings	  favoring	  a	  broad	  coverage	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  8.1.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  chart,	  some	  technologies	  have	  negative	  abatement	  cost.	  Including	  
these	  technologies	  no	  only	  reduce	  carbon	  emission	  with	  a	  substantial	  amount,	  but	  also	  bring	  in	  
economic	  benefits	  from	  the	  savings	  of	  consuming	  less	  energy.	  These	  technologies	  are	  however	  
not	  necessarily	  included	  in	  reality,	  even	  though	  the	  adoption	  is	  profitable	  even	  without	  the	  
support	  of	  emission	  trading.	  The	  existence	  of	  technological	  potential	  of	  negative	  abatement	  cost	  
suggests	  that	  without	  legal	  binding	  constraints,	  the	  potential	  would	  not	  be	  exploited.	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  and	  second	  trading	  period,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  did	  not	  include	  the	  building	  and	  transportation	  
sectors,	  even	  though	  these	  sectors	  have	  huge	  and	  low-­‐cost	  abatement	  potential.	  The	  primary	  
reason	  is	  the	  difficulty	  in	  monitoring	  emission	  data	  of	  these	  two	  sectors.	  The	  sectors	  that	  were	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covered	  are	  mainly	  power	  and	  heat	  sectors,	  and	  heavy	  industrial	  sectors	  such	  as	  cement	  &	  lime,	  
steel,	  aluminum,	  refineries,	  glass,	  pulp	  &	  paper.	  The	  EU	  ETS	  covers	  some	  12,000	  installations.	  




Figure	  10.1	  Cost	  curve	  for	  greenhouse	  gas	  reduction	  	  
Source:	  Mckinsey	  (2007)	  
	  
The	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  show	  some	  big	  differences	  compared	  to	  EU	  ETS,	  in	  terms	  of	  sector	  
coverage.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  4.1,	  three	  pilots	  (Beijing,	  Tianjin,	  Shanghai)	  intend	  to	  include	  
building	  sectors	  into	  the	  scheme.	  This	  is	  in	  my	  view	  an	  improvement	  China	  made	  compared	  to	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the	  EU	  counterpart.	  With	  a	  high	  urbanization	  rate,	  building	  sectors	  emit	  a	  substantial	  amount	  in	  
the	  three	  municipalities	  of	  Beijing,	  Tianjin,	  and	  Shanghai.	  Earlier,	  China	  has	  implemented	  several	  
policy	  measures	  to	  incentivize	  energy	  efficiency	  improvements	  in	  large	  buildings	  in	  some	  Chinese	  
major	  cities.	  A	  good	  track	  of	  energy	  consumption	  is	  available;	  therefore	  monitoring	  the	  emission	  
is	  feasible	  by	  converting	  energy	  usage	  into	  emissions.	  Inclusion	  of	  low-­‐abatement-­‐cost	  sectors	  
like	  building	  would	  shift	  down	  the	  abatement	  cost,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8.1.	  	  
	  
Regarding	  sectoral	  allocation,	  first	  phase	  of	  EU	  ETS	  witnessed	  large	  variation	  across	  sectors,	  in	  
terms	  of	  net	  short/long	  position.	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  electricity	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  short,	  while	  all	  
the	  industrial	  sectors	  are	  mostly	  long	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  K.,	  2007).	  This	  reflects	  the	  key	  
consideration	  in	  sectoral	  allocation:	  generous	  treatment	  of	  sectors	  facing	  international	  
competition,	  and	  achieving	  major	  mitigation	  from	  sectors	  only	  facing	  domestic	  competition.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  10.2	  Short	  and	  long	  position	  by	  EU-­‐Wide	  sectors	  
Source:	  (Barbara	  Buchner,	  2006)	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The	  similar	  pattern	  is	  expected	  from	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  as	  well.	  With	  economic	  
development	  and	  high	  employment	  as	  the	  top	  priorities,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  pilot	  schemes	  will	  
allocate	  strict	  caps	  on	  industrial	  sectors	  exposed	  to	  international	  competition.	  Compared	  to	  EU,	  
this	  consideration	  is	  more	  important	  since	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  is	  highly	  export-­‐oriented.	  
Sectors	  like	  steel	  and	  cement	  rely	  heavily	  on	  foreign	  demand	  and	  compete	  at	  low	  margins.	  A	  
high	  carbon	  cost	  could	  introduce	  economic	  shocks.	  The	  sectoral	  allocation	  could	  differ	  across	  
pilots	  depending	  on	  the	  specific	  condition	  of	  the	  pilot	  scheme.	  A	  sector	  might	  have	  different	  
abatement	  potential,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pilots	  have	  different	  strategic	  interests	  in	  planning	  which	  
sectors	  should	  be	  “cleaner”.	  The	  general	  principle	  is,	  nevertheless,	  to	  achieve	  the	  balance	  
between	  imposing	  carbon	  cost	  and	  maintain	  sustainable	  economic	  growth.	  
	  
11. New	  entrant	  reserve	  and	  close	  provision	  	  
The	  new	  entrant	  reserve	  and	  closer	  provision	  are	  two	  unique	  aspects	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS	  compared	  to	  
previous	  cap	  and	  trade	  schemes.	  The	  new	  entrant	  reserve	  is	  namely	  to	  set	  aside	  a	  certain	  
amount	  of	  allowances	  for	  installations	  built	  and	  operated	  after	  the	  trading	  period	  has	  started.	  
The	  number	  of	  allowances	  for	  new	  entrant	  reserve	  is	  set	  to	  195	  million	  tons,	  or	  3	  percent	  of	  total	  
cap	  (6500	  Mt).	  However,	  the	  percentage	  of	  new	  entrant	  allowance	  in	  total	  allowances	  differs	  
vastly	  between	  member	  states,	  from	  as	  much	  as	  26	  percent	  in	  Malta	  down	  to	  0.4	  percent	  in	  
Poland	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  K.,	  2007).	  	  
	  
The	  new	  entrant	  reserve	  is	  beneficial	  for	  the	  Chinese	  pilots	  to	  adopt.	  The	  new	  entrant	  reserve	  
has	  two	  benefits.	  Firstly,	  by	  reserving	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  allowances	  for	  the	  potential	  demand	  
from	  new	  entrants	  introduce	  a	  higher	  certainty	  of	  supply-­‐demand	  balance.	  Second,	  a	  correct	  
treatment	  of	  new	  entrants	  ensures	  that	  the	  new	  installations	  compete	  with	  existing	  ones	  on	  
equal	  terms.	  These	  two	  benefits	  might	  be	  more	  important	  for	  China,	  where	  rapid	  economic	  
growth,	  industrial	  development	  is	  still	  going	  on.	  A	  fair	  amount	  of	  new	  power	  plants	  and	  factories	  
will	  be	  built	  in	  relatively	  underdeveloped	  pilots	  like	  Hubei	  and	  Chongqing.	  Therefore,	  setting	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aside	  allowances	  for	  these	  potential	  new	  emitters	  is	  critical	  to	  ensure	  the	  balance	  of	  supply	  and	  
demand	  of	  allowances.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  is	  the	  determination	  of	  allowance	  amount	  to	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  
new	  entrants.	  From	  the	  experience	  of	  EU,	  one	  should	  follow	  the	  principle	  of	  allocating	  
allowances	  based	  on	  some	  benchmarks	  for	  a	  specific	  technology	  in	  a	  specific	  sector.	  The	  
benchmark	  itself	  is	  usually	  based	  on	  some	  assessment	  of	  best	  practice	  or	  technology	  multiplied	  
by	  expected	  production	  or	  new	  capacity	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  K.,	  2007).	  	  The	  methodology	  is	  
however	  difficult	  to	  implement	  due	  to	  complexity	  in	  defining	  the	  benchmark.	  In	  the	  power	  
sector	  for	  instance,	  defining	  the	  benchmark	  comprises	  of	  the	  categorization	  of	  installations	  in	  
terms	  of	  fuels,	  technologies,	  history	  etc.	  To	  be	  more	  practical,	  China	  could	  initially	  limit	  allocating	  
new	  entrant	  allowances	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  sectors,	  where	  the	  number	  of	  expected	  new	  entrants	  
and	  technologies	  is	  clearer.	  	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  new	  entrant	  reserve,	  closure	  provision	  involves	  the	  decision	  on	  how	  the	  
allowances	  allocated	  to	  installations	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  closed	  should	  be	  treated.	  The	  use	  of	  
closure	  provision	  is	  to	  incentivize	  companies	  not	  to	  close	  out	  and	  relocate	  their	  existing	  
production	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  K.,	  2007).	  While	  the	  implementation	  of	  closure	  provision	  varies	  
within	  the	  EU	  member	  states,	  the	  general	  principle	  is	  the	  retaining	  or	  transferring	  of	  the	  
allowances	  from	  closed	  facility	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  facility	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  same	  member	  state.	  
The	  key	  consideration	  of	  this	  principle	  is	  to	  avoid	  that	  companies	  move	  their	  production	  to	  
places	  outside	  the	  schemes	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  benefit	  from	  extra	  allowances.	  This	  principle	  is	  
also	  applicable	  in	  China.	  On	  one	  hand,	  this	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  that	  companies	  covered	  by	  the	  
schemes	  move	  their	  production	  to	  other	  regions	  of	  China	  that	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  scheme.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  avoids	  the	  carbon	  emission	  leaked	  from	  the	  pilots	  to	  places	  outside	  the	  
scheme.	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12. Bottom-­‐level	  allocation:	  Benchmark	  or	  share	  of	  emission?	  	  
Benchmarking	  is	  a	  methodology	  to	  determine	  the	  allocation	  of	  emissions	  to	  individual	  
installations.	  The	  allocation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  uniform	  emission	  rate	  adjusted	  with	  some	  index	  of	  
historical	  activity	  or	  capacity.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  benchmark	  is	  a	  relatively	  fair	  way	  to	  
determine	  allocation,	  it	  is	  not	  widely	  used	  by	  EU	  member	  states	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  K.,	  2007).	  
The	  main	  reason	  is	  heterogeneity	  between	  sectors	  and	  even	  within	  sectors.	  Especially	  the	  latter,	  
because	  the	  benchmark	  for	  determining	  allocation	  for	  installations	  of	  a	  specific	  sector	  become	  
particularly	  controversial	  if	  it	  is	  not	  fairly	  designed.	  The	  heterogeneity	  within	  a	  sector	  is	  primarily	  
due	  to	  different	  production	  technologies	  and	  inputs.	  For	  instance,	  emissions	  from	  steel	  
production	  differ	  greatly	  between	  blast	  furnace	  operation	  and	  electric	  arc	  furnace.	  	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  benchmarking,	  share	  of	  recent	  emission	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  primary	  
determinant	  of	  allocation	  instead.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  share	  refers	  to	  the	  installation’s	  share	  of	  
the	  sector’s	  recent	  emissions,	  which	  is	  determined	  by	  some	  baseline	  period	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  B.	  
K.,	  2007).	  The	  advantage	  of	  using	  the	  share	  of	  recent	  emission	  is	  primarily	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  implement.	  
With	  available	  recent	  emission	  data,	  this	  approach	  significantly	  reduces	  the	  time	  and	  decision	  
process	  compared	  to	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  spent	  on	  the	  selection	  and	  evaluation	  of	  a	  
benchmark.	  Using	  share	  of	  recent	  emissions	  also	  place	  the	  installations	  in	  a	  position	  with	  easy-­‐
to-­‐anticipate	  balance	  between	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  allowances	  in	  the	  early	  trial	  years.	  If	  using	  
benchmarks,	  an	  installation	  with	  high	  recent	  emissions	  might	  be	  allocated	  with	  very	  few	  
allowances,	  therefore	  facing	  high	  compliance	  cost	  in	  the	  early	  years.	  Introducing	  the	  impact	  on	  
business	  from	  sudden	  high	  compliance	  cost	  is	  not	  really	  the	  intention	  of	  ETS,	  which	  is	  rather	  to	  
give	  a	  signal	  for	  long-­‐term	  investments.	  
	  
However,	  using	  share	  of	  recent	  emission	  is	  not	  fair	  to	  installations	  that	  adopted	  emission	  
mitigation	  efforts	  before	  the	  scheme	  started.	  In	  principle	  those	  installations	  should	  be	  credited	  
for	  their	  efforts.	  However,	  those	  installations	  would	  be	  allocated	  fewer	  allowances,	  reducing	  the	  
potential	  revenue	  stream	  from	  emission	  trading.	  This	  problem	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  amplified	  in	  
China,	  where	  the	  emission-­‐level	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  of	  installations	  vary	  vastly.	  China	  imposed	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various	  measures	  to	  eliminate	  inefficient	  and	  dirty	  industrial	  installations	  and	  power	  generators.	  
However,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  large	  number	  of	  backward	  facilities.	  The	  degree	  of	  fairness	  by	  using	  
recent	  emission	  share	  depends	  on	  the	  variety	  of	  companies.	  	  
	  
China,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  should	  consider	  allocating	  allowances	  based	  on	  share	  of	  recent	  
emissions;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  China	  can	  adopt	  some	  practical	  solution	  to	  make	  the	  approach	  
fairer.	  	  	  	  
	  
13. Linkage	  and	  offsets	  	  
Linkage	  refers	  to	  using	  the	  credits	  from	  other	  carbon	  market	  for	  the	  compliance	  rather	  than	  
using	  the	  permits	  from	  the	  system	  of	  its	  own.	  The	  EU	  ETS	  linked	  to	  the	  project-­‐based	  Flexible	  
Mechanisms	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  In	  such	  way,	  the	  Certified	  Emission	  Reduction	  (CERs)	  
units	  generated	  from	  Clean	  Development	  Mechanism	  (CDM)	  projects	  can	  be	  used	  for	  
compliance	  under	  EU	  ETS;	  similar	  to	  CDM,	  is	  the	  Join	  Implementation,	  which	  generates	  Emission	  
Reduction	  Units	  (ERUs)	  that	  can	  also	  be	  used	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  credits	  of	  CERs	  and	  ERU	  
generated	  from	  Kyoto	  Protocol’s	  Flexible	  Mechanisms	  are	  commonly	  generalized	  as	  offset	  
credits	  or	  offsets.	  	  
	  
The	  intention	  of	  linking	  EU	  ETS	  to	  other	  carbon	  markets	  is	  to	  exploit	  the	  low	  cost	  reduction	  
alternative	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  Since	  carbon	  emission	  is	  homogeneous,	  emission	  reduction	  
occurring	  in	  different	  locations	  and	  through	  various	  technologies	  has	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  global	  
warming.	  	  By	  linking	  to	  external	  carbon	  markets	  the	  EU	  is	  able	  to	  take	  advantages	  of	  low	  cost	  
reduction	  means	  to	  achieve	  its	  commitment	  in	  emission	  reduction,	  as	  well	  as	  facilitate	  the	  
support	  to	  developing	  countries	  in	  emission	  mitigation.	  	  
	  
However,	  linking	  to	  CDM	  and	  JI	  brings	  controversies,	  which	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  way	  the	  offset	  
credits	  is	  generated	  and	  verified.	  As	  offset	  credits	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS,	  this	  creates	  a	  
significant	  demand	  for	  such	  credits.	  However,	  justifying	  those	  credits	  as	  “additional	  reduction”	  is	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difficult.	  Credits	  that	  truly	  indicate	  emission	  reduction	  should	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  reduction	  
is	  additional	  to	  the	  measures	  that	  are	  already	  taking	  place,	  otherwise	  the	  credits	  are	  merely	  
“anyway	  tons”	  (A.	  Denny	  Ellerman	  P.	  L.,	  2008).	  Another	  controversy	  is	  the	  oversupply	  of	  CERs	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  cheap	  cost	  in	  generating	  a	  CER	  from	  certain	  types	  of	  methodology.	  A	  typical	  example	  
is	  the	  offsets	  from	  destruction	  of	  industrial	  gases	  such	  as	  HFC-­‐23	  and	  N2O.	  The	  controversial	  lies	  
in	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  the	  cost	  for	  destroying	  the	  industrial	  gases	  is	  low,	  it	  does	  not	  create	  any	  
social	  or	  environmental	  benefits.	  Instead,	  it	  creates	  perverse	  incentive	  to	  ramp	  up	  production	  
from	  which	  the	  industrial	  gases	  as	  byproducts	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  destroyed.	  	  
	  
The	  measures	  adopted	  by	  EU	  to	  tackle	  such	  problems	  from	  using	  offsets	  are	  to	  set	  quantitative	  
limits	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  offsets	  can	  be	  used:	  about	  13%	  of	  the	  allocation.	  The	  EU	  also	  
banned	  the	  use	  of	  offsets	  from	  industrial	  gases	  destruction.	  The	  intention	  is	  to	  avoid	  speculating	  
on	  cheap	  offsets	  to	  replace	  necessary	  effort	  to	  abate	  the	  emission.	  	  
	  
Linkage	  will	  take	  place	  in	  China	  as	  well.	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  13.1	  every	  pilot	  allows	  the	  use	  of	  
offset	  credits	  known	  as	  “China	  Certified	  Emission	  Reduction	  (CCER)”,	  and	  credits	  from	  forestry	  
plantation.	  Except	  Shanghai,	  Shenzhen	  and	  Chongqing,	  all	  pilots	  set	  the	  quantitative	  limit	  from	  5%	  
up	  to	  15%.	  The	  CCERs	  are	  credits	  from	  52	  emission	  reduction	  methodologies	  recognized	  by	  
NDRC.	  These	  52	  methodologies	  generally	  originate	  from	  the	  CDM	  methodologies	  commonly	  
used	  in	  the	  Chinese	  CDM	  projects.	  The	  revenue	  from	  selling	  CERs	  has	  declined	  dramatically	  with	  
the	  record-­‐low	  CERs	  price.	  As	  the	  outlook	  from	  EU	  ETS	  still	  remains	  bearish,	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  
schemes	  can	  become	  the	  new	  revenue	  source	  for	  the	  CDM	  projects	  in	  China.	  The	  projects	  can	  
verify	  the	  credits	  as	  CCER	  and	  sell	  to	  the	  Chinese	  markets	  instead.	  In	  short,	  by	  using	  the	  existing	  
CDM	  projects	  China	  is	  able	  to	  exploit	  the	  existing	  low	  cost	  abatement	  opportunities.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  two	  controversies	  remain.	  The	  first	  is	  China	  allows	  the	  use	  of	  industrial	  gas	  offsets14,	  
which	  is	  banned	  in	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  over-­‐supply	  of	  offset	  credits.	  By	  estimate	  HFCs,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Point	  Carbon	  Mar	  2013,	  “China	  to	  allow	  HFC	  23	  offsets	  in	  domestic	  CO2	  markets”,	  
http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2214345?date=20130311&sdtc=1	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PFCs,	  and	  N2O	  reductions	  represent	  71	  per	  cent	  of	  offsets	  issued	  from	  the	  CDM	  projects,	  of	  
which	  the	  main	  portion	  is	  in	  China15.	  Criticism	  focus	  on	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  use	  of	  cheap	  and	  over-­‐
supplied	  offsets	  might	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  actual	  emission	  reduction	  in	  the	  pilots,	  and	  it	  will	  
deteriorate	  the	  incentive	  for	  the	  pilots	  to	  take	  effective	  efforts	  in	  mitigating	  emission.	  	  
Table	  13.1	  Use	  of	  Offset	  Credits	  in	  the	  Pilot	  Schemes	  
	  
Source:	  Point	  Carbon	  
	  
However,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  criticisms	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  use	  of	  offsets	  is	  limited	  by	  a	  
certain	  percentage	  of	  the	  allocation.	  In	  addition,	  allowing	  using	  industrial	  gas	  related	  offsets	  
creates	  new	  demand	  for	  such	  credits	  as	  the	  demand	  from	  EU	  ETS	  no	  longer	  exists.	  Nevertheless,	  
China	  should	  eliminate	  the	  risk	  of	  price	  depression	  from	  using	  offsets.	  In	  addition	  to	  quantitative	  
limits,	  as	  the	  trading	  will	  be	  carried	  on	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  Chinese	  pilots	  should	  gradually	  reduce	  
the	  use	  of	  cheap	  offsets.	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  China	  should	  also	  ensure	  the	  “Additionality”	  of	  offsets,	  
especially	  the	  industrial	  gas	  related	  offsets,	  by	  imposing	  the	  restriction	  on	  building	  new	  
production	  capacity	  that	  generates	  such	  gases.	  In	  the	  end,	  using	  cheap	  offsets	  is	  not	  in	  the	  
strategic	  interest	  of	  China,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  incentivize	  advanced	  emission	  mitigation	  technologies.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  "UNEP	  Risoe	  CDM/JI	  Pipeline	  Analysis	  and	  Database".	  UNEP	  Risoe	  Centre.	  2010-­‐02-­‐01.	  
Retrieved	  2010-­‐02-­‐22.	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Part	  4:	  Conclusion	  
14. Global	  implication	  of	  the	  Chinese	  ETS	  
Established	  in	  2005,	  in	  8	  years,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  has	  evolved	  into	  the	  world’s	  largest	  and	  most	  active	  
carbon	  trading	  market,	  although	  the	  current	  low	  price	  indicates	  the	  market	  is	  in	  a	  crisis	  and	  
needs	  fundamental	  reform.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  EU	  ETS	  sets	  an	  example	  that	  influences	  the	  
establishment	  of	  carbon	  regime	  across	  the	  world.	  Following	  the	  EU,	  many	  countries	  adopt	  
carbon	  trading	  schemes	  as	  a	  device	  to	  achieve	  their	  emission	  reduction	  targets,	  including	  South	  
Korea,	  Japan,	  New	  Zealand,	  Australia	  and	  of	  course	  China.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  the	  biggest	  
contribution	  from	  the	  EU	  ETS:	  facilitate	  the	  adoption	  of	  effective	  measures	  to	  tackle	  global	  
warming.	  	  
	  
After	  the	  cornerstone	  set	  by	  EU,	  what	  can	  the	  Chinese	  ETS	  bring?	  Firstly,	  establishing	  carbon	  
trading	  market	  is	  a	  firm	  step	  further	  on	  mitigating	  domestic	  carbon	  emission.	  Tackling	  global	  
warming	  is	  a	  mission	  impossible	  without	  China,	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  emitter	  of	  greenhouse	  gases.	  
When	  carbon	  trading	  becomes	  reality,	  it	  will	  strengthen	  China’s	  image	  in	  committing	  to	  mitigate	  
emissions.	  Lessons	  made	  by	  China	  would	  be	  valuable	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  learn	  and	  adopt.	  
If	  the	  Chinese	  market	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  successful,	  it	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  emission	  trading	  is	  a	  
feasible	  approach	  for	  developing	  countries	  where	  economic	  development	  is	  naturally	  at	  a	  higher	  
priority.	  The	  Chinese	  experience	  in	  carbon	  trading	  will	  demonstrate	  a	  new	  way	  of	  sustainable	  
development	  to	  developing	  countries.	  	  
	  
As	  the	  Chinese	  carbon	  trading	  schemes	  are	  being	  established,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  global	  carbon	  
regime	  becomes	  clearer	  (there	  is	  already	  indications	  that	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  will	  link	  to	  the	  
Californian	  market16).	  A	  global	  carbon	  regime	  is	  the	  fundamental	  requirement	  to	  tackle	  global	  
warming	  as	  it	  shows	  the	  global	  commitment	  and	  global	  efforts.	  With	  China	  being	  more	  involved	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Point	  Carbon	  May	  2013,	  “U.N.	  says	  California	  and	  China	  in	  CO2	  market	  link	  talks”,	  
http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2393413?date=20130529&sdtc=1	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in	  such	  a	  regime,	  countries	  like	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  Russia	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  join	  and	  take	  firmer	  
action	  in	  emission	  mitigation.	  	  
	  
The	  above	  discussion	  relies	  on	  the	  optimistic	  outlook	  that	  the	  Chinese	  pilot	  carbon	  trading	  
schemes	  will	  be	  successful.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  carbon	  trading	  turns	  out	  less	  effective	  than	  expected	  in	  
China,	  the	  experience	  is	  also	  valuable.	  Fail	  in	  implementing	  effective	  carbon	  trading	  schemes	  in	  
China	  will	  show	  the	  reasons	  why	  carbon	  trading	  is	  not	  applicable	  in	  countries	  like	  China.	  The	  
reason	  might	  be	  the	  low	  degree	  of	  market	  liberalization,	  low	  transparency,	  over	  modest	  cap	  and	  
so	  on.	  All	  the	  lessons	  are	  valuable	  to	  countries	  planning	  to	  establish	  ETS	  or	  the	  countries	  that	  
plan	  to	  reform	  their	  domestic	  carbon	  markets.	  	  
	  
15. Final	  conclusion	  
This	  paper	  assesses	  the	  seven	  Chinese	  carbon	  schemes	  being	  planned	  and	  implemented,	  and	  
relates	  the	  relevant	  lessons	  from	  EU	  ETS	  to	  the	  Chinese	  circumstances.	  With	  10%	  of	  the	  world’s	  
GDP,	  China	  accounts	  for	  20%	  of	  global	  energy	  consumption	  and	  25%	  of	  global	  CO2	  emission.	  The	  
abatement	  potential	  is	  massive	  in	  China.	  With	  the	  800	  Mt	  CO2	  emissions	  covered,	  the	  seven	  
Chinese	  pilot	  schemes	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  world’s	  second	  biggest	  carbon	  trading	  market	  in	  
terms	  of	  covered	  emissions.	  Among	  the	  seven	  pilot	  areas,	  Guangdong	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  
highest	  carbon	  price,	  since	  this	  region	  must	  abate	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  emissions	  compared	  to	  BAU	  
level	  to	  meet	  its	  emission	  intensity	  reduction	  target.	  
	  
The	  Chinese	  schemes	  are	  similar	  to	  EU	  ETS	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  also	  have	  their	  unique	  features.	  
The	  Chinese	  schemes	  restrict	  emissions	  at	  the	  company	  level	  and	  the	  covered	  sectors	  are	  more	  
diverse	  compared	  to	  EU	  ETS.	  By	  shortening	  the	  trading	  period	  to	  one	  year,	  the	  Chinese	  pilots	  
have	  more	  political	  flexibilities	  to	  adjust	  the	  cap	  and	  maintain	  price	  stability.	  However,	  such	  
regulatory	  flexibilities	  need	  to	  be	  backed	  by	  firm	  and	  clear	  political	  commitment	  to	  the	  carbon	  
trading	  schemes.	  If	  China	  manages	  to	  keep	  its	  commitment	  to	  carbon	  trading	  and	  properly	  take	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political	  measures	  to	  maintain	  price	  stability,	  the	  Chinese	  schemes	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  
experience	  price	  crash	  than	  EU	  ETS.	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  valuable	  for	  China	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  experience	  from	  the	  EU	  ETS.	  The	  general	  
principles	  reflected	  from	  the	  EU	  ETS	  lessons	  are	  the	  importance	  in	  keeping	  price	  stability,	  
ensuring	  the	  equality	  in	  permits	  trading,	  eliminating	  carbon	  leakage	  and	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  
finding	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  ideal	  approaches	  and	  being	  practical.	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  is	  never	  
possible	  to	  have	  a	  perfect	  start;	  getting	  started	  and	  correct	  the	  course	  along	  way	  make	  the	  EU	  
ETS	  the	  world	  most	  successful	  carbon	  trading	  market.	  	  
	  
Thirty	  years	  ago,	  the	  Chinese	  adopted	  capitalism	  but	  implemented	  it	  with	  “the	  Chinese	  
Characteristics”,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  remarkably	  successful	  transformation	  in	  the	  country’s	  economic	  
and	  social	  development.	  Now,	  China	  decides	  to	  use	  the	  carbon	  trading	  market	  to	  reduce	  its	  CO2	  
emissions	  in	  a	  cost-­‐efficient	  manner.	  Again,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  carbon	  trading	  market	  will	  depend	  
on	  whether	  China	  can	  adopt	  the	  western	  concept	  of	  emission	  trading	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
adapting	  emission	  trading	  to	  its	  unique	  environment.	  	  
	   	  
	   57	  
References	  
A.	  Denny	  Ellerman,	  B.	  K.	  (2007).	  The	  European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme:	  Origins,	  
Allocation,	  and	  Early	  Results.	  Review	  of	  Environmental	  Economics	  and	  Policy	  ,	  1	  (1),	  66-­‐87.	  
A.	  Denny	  Ellerman,	  P.	  L.	  (2008).	  The	  European	  Union’s	  Emissions	  Trading	  System	  in	  perspective.	  
MASSACHUSETTS	  INSTITUTE	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY.	  
Böhringer,	  C.	  A.	  (2005).	  Climate	  policy	  beyond	  Kyoto:	  Quo	  vadis?	  A	  computable	  general	  
equlibrium	  analysis	  based	  on	  expert	  judgements.	  KYKLOS	  ,	  4	  (58),	  467-­‐493.	  
Barbara	  Buchner,	  C.	  C.	  (2006,	  September).	  The	  Allocation	  of	  European	  Union	  Allowances:	  
Lessons,	  Unifying	  Themes	  and	  General	  Principles.	  
Baron,	  R.	  S.	  (2002).	  Towards	  International	  Emissions	  Trading:	  Design	  Implication	  for	  Linkages.	  3rd	  
CATEP	  Workshop	  on	  Global	  Trading.	  Kiel	  Institute	  for	  World	  Economics.	  
Daniel	  H.	  Rosen,	  T.	  H.	  (2007).	  China	  Energy:	  A	  guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed	  .	  	  
David	  I	  Stern,	  F.	  J.	  (2010).	  How	  Ambitious	  are	  China	  and	  India’s	  Emissions	  Intensity	  Targets?	  
Ellerman	  A.D,	  J.	  H.	  (1998).	  The	  Effects	  on	  Developing	  Countries	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  CO2	  
Emission	  Trading.	  MIT	  Global	  Change	  Joint	  Program	  Report	  No.41.	  
Gao	  Pengfei,	  C.	  W.	  (2004).	  Marginal	  Carbon	  Abatement	  Cost	  in	  China.	  Journal	  of	  Tsinghua	  Univ	  
(Sci&Tech)	  ,	  44	  (9),	  11-­‐14.	  
Green	  Peace.	  (2008).	  Polluting	  Power:	  Ranking	  China's	  Power	  Companies.	  	  
HSBC.	  (2011).	  DELIVERING	  LOW	  CARBON	  GROWTH:	  A	  Guide	  to	  China’s	  12th	  Five	  Year	  Plan.	  HSBC.	  
J,	  G.	  (2000).	  Carbon	  Emission	  Reduction	  Trading	  Model.	  htp://www.ghgmarket.info	  .	  
Kolstad,	  C.	  D.	  (2000).	  Environmental	  Economics.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Mark	  D.	  Levine,	  N.	  T.	  (2008).	  Global	  Carbon	  Emissions	  in	  the	  Coming	  Decades:	  The	  Case	  of	  China.	  
ERNEST	  ORLANDO	  LAWRENCE	  BERKELEY	  NATIONAL	  LABORATORY,	  Environmental	  Energy	  
Technologies	  Division.	  Ernest	  Orlando	  Lawrence	  Berkeley	  National	  Laboratory,	  University	  of	  
California.	  
National	  Reform	  and	  Development	  Committee	  of	  China.	  (2010).	  China's	  Policy	  and	  Action	  in	  
Addressing	  Global	  Warming.	  	  
Steffen	  Brunner,	  C.	  F.	  (2008).	  Emission	  Trading	  System:	  an	  overview.	  	  
Tsinghua	  University	  .	  (2011).	  Review	  of	  Low	  Carbon	  Development	  in	  China:	  2010	  Report.	  	  
	   58	  
Tulpule	  V,	  B.	  S.	  (1998).	  An	  Economic	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  Using	  the	  Global	  Trading	  
and	  Environment	  Model.	  OECD	  Workshop	  on	  "The	  Economic	  Modelling	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  
Background	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol"	  .	  
Wang	  Zheng,	  Z.	  Y.	  (2008).	  Study	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Carbon	  Emission	  in	  Provincial	  Scale	  of	  China	  and	  
Countermeasures	  for	  Reducing	  its	  Emission	  (in	  Chinese).	  Strategy	  &	  Policy	  Dicision	  Research	  ,	  23	  
(2),	  109-­‐115.	  
	  
	   	  
	   59	  
Appendix	  I:	  Inputs	  and	  Assumptions	  for	  Estimating	  Marginal	  
Abatement	  Cost	  
	  
The	  result	  from	  the	  Emission	  Projection	  and	  Policy	  Analysis	  model	  (EPPA)	  on	  estimating	  the	  
Chinese	  marginal	  abatement	  cost:	  
	  	  
Abatement	  ratio,	  %	  of	  gross	  emission	   Marginal	  abatement	  cost,	  USD/ton	  CO2	  
10	   9	  
20	   24	  
30	   45	  
40	   72	  
	  
Gao	  Pengfei’s	  research	  finds	  that	  in	  the	  medium	  term	  the	  maximum	  abatement	  potential	  for	  
China	  is	  1600	  Mt.	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  above	  research,	  to	  estimate	  the	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  in	  each	  pilot	  area,	  I	  
assume:	  
• The	  shape	  of	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  curve	  of	  each	  pilot	  is	  the	  same	  as	  China.	  The	  only	  
difference	  is	  the	  scale	  of	  abatement	  amount.	  
• The	  maximum	  abatement	  amount	  of	  each	  pilot	  is	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  maximum	  
abatement	  amount	  of	  China	  (1600	  Mt).	  The	  percentage	  is	  the	  share	  of	  the	  pilot’s	  
emission	  in	  China’s	  gross	  emission.	  
	  
China	   Beijing	   Tianjin	   Shanghai	   Guangdong	   Hubei	  
2010	  Emission,	  Mt	  CO2	   6700	   121	   159	   254	   520	   358	  
Share	  of	  emission	   100%	   2%	   2%	   4%	   8%	   5%	  
Abatement	  potential,	  Mt	  CO2	   1600	   29	   38	   61	   124	   85	  
	  
• If	  there	  is	  not	  expected	  abatement,	  the	  marginal	  cost	  is	  the	  minimum	  marginal	  cost	  on	  
the	  curve.	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With	  the	  expected	  abatement	  estimated	  as	  below	  (negative	  number	  means	  emission	  in	  2015	  is	  
less	  than	  2013	  level):	  
	   Expected	  abatement	  2013-­‐2015	  ,	  Mt	  
CO2	  	  
Beijing	   1.3	  
Tianjin	   61.1	  
Shanghai	   -­‐41.7	  
Guangdong	   -­‐281.0	  
Hubei	   -­‐50.4	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The	  marginal	  abatement	  cost	  in	  each	  pilot	  area	  is	  hence:	  
	   Marginal	  abatement	  cost,	  USD/t	  
Beijing	   4	  
Tianjin	   4	  
Shanghai	   18	  
Guangdong	   28	  
Hubei	   18	  
	  
